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LAND USE REGULATION IN AN AGE OF
HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
DAVID A. DANA*
In order to regulate proposed residential and commercial land
development, states and localities employ a range of tools,
including development prohibitions and conditions. Local
regulators' discretion as to when they may impose such conditions
or prohibitions varies by jurisdiction, but state courts generally
have rejected claims that localities exceeded their statutory or
constitutional authority in doing so. Until recently, United States
Supreme Court jurisprudence paralleled this deferential state
court jurisprudence; however, in the recent cases Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the
Court held that, although states and localities retain broad
discretion to deny landowners permission for residential or
commercial development, there are substantial constitutional
limitations on the conditions such governments may impose on
their grants of development permission. This Article explores the
ways in which judicial review of development conditions, coupled
with the absence of serious judicial scrutiny of development
prohibitions, may diminish allocative efficiency in land
development markets. After reviewing the law and politics of
development conditions, Professor Dana argues that judicial
scrutiny of development conditions may impede, rather than
enhance, the efficient functioning of development markets in the
United States. Using fundamental economic concepts and a
model of the land development process as a game between
developers and regulators, he analyzes a range of inefficiencies
that may result from the constitutional tests enunciated in Nollan
and Dolan.
* Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. B.A., J.D. Har-
vard University. I greatly benefited from the comments of the participants in faculty
workshops at Boston University School of Law and Northwestern University School of
Law. I owe special thanks to Jack Beermann, Bob Bone, Ron Cass, Keith Hylton, Susan
Koniak, Michael Kremer, Jim Lindgren, Steve Marks, Tom Merrill, Julie Schrager, and
Stewart Sterk.
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For many years, the United States Supreme Court chose not to
interfere with state and local regulation of new residential and com-
mercial development. Although the Court repeatedly stated that the
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Constitution imposes some limitations on development regulation,'
its decisions suggested otherwise. The Court consistently held either
that development regulations were constitutional or that their consti-
tutionality was unripe for federal court review.2
In two recent cases, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
and Dolan v. City of Tigard,4 the Court broke with this long tradition
of deference and substantially limited the constitutional authority of
localities to impose conditions on their grants of development per-
mission. Invoking the so-called "unconstitutional conditions
doctrine,"5 the Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth
1. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485
(1987) (affirming that land use regulation can effect a taking when it fails to "substantially
advance legitimate state interests.... or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land") (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255,260 (1980) (citations omitted)).
2. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 632-33
(1981) (dismissing as unripe a challenge to an open-space zoning designation); Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260-63 (1980) (rejecting a facial challenge to an open-space
zoning ordinance); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 133 n.29,
138 (1978) (upholding landmark zoning restrictions and suggesting that takings challenges
to land use regulations will be reviewed under the same rational basis test as is ordinarily
applied to economic legislation).
3. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
4. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
5. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413, 1415
(1989) (defining the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as "hold[ing] that government
may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional
right, even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether"). As Professor Fre-
derick Schauer has convincingly argued, there is no single rationale that explains the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in the diverse contexts in which the courts have in-
voked it. See Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera
of Constitutional Consistency, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 989, 1001-05 (1995). Moreover, the
courts, and especially the Supreme Court, have been inconsistent in their adherence to
the doctrine, even in cases involving ostensibly similar circumstances:
The Court has concluded, for example, that the selective exemption of some
magazines from state taxation on the basis of subject matter unconstitutionally
infringes speech, but that the selective subsidy of the medical expenses of child-
birth but not abortion does not unconstitutionally infringe reproductive
autonomy. Having held that using funding conditions to induce public broad-
casters to segregate editorializing activity would violate freedom of speech, the
Court held that using tax benefit conditions to induce nonprofit organizations to
spin off their lobbying activities to a separate affiliate poses no similar infringe-
ment. Having held that denial of unemployment compensation to Saturday
sabbatarians unconstitutionally burdens freedom of worship, the Court has re-
jected every other claim that conditions on food stamps or welfare payments
unconstitutionally burden rights to speech, expressive association, intimate asso-
ciation, or freedom from unwarranted searches.
Sullivan, supra, at 1416-17 (footnotes omitted). For other helpful accounts of the doc-
trine, see Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Cour 1987 Term-Foreword:
Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1988); Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a
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Amendment6 requires that conditions on government grants of de-
velopment permission meet both a "nexus" and a "rough
proportionality" test.7 In order to meet the "nexus" test, a develop-
ment condition must bear a "nexus" with the stated purpose of the
regulations that would have authorized the state or locality to deny
development permission altogether.8 The "rough proportionality"
test requires a court to compare the burden of a development condi-
tion on the property owner with the benefits of the condition in
mitigating the adverse impacts of the proposed development. A con-
dition is unconstitutional if the burden on the property owner is
disproportionate to the condition's mitigation benefits.9
This Article explores the ways in which nexus/rough proportion-
ality review of development conditions, coupled with the absence of
serious judicial scrutiny of development prohibitions," may diminish
allocative efficiency in land development markets. The analysis con-
siders the possible consequences of direct judicial review of
development conditions and the possible consequences of local
regulators' efforts to avoid such review. As a methodological matter,
the Article builds on a body of legal scholarship emphasizing the im-
portance of legal rules for bargaining among parties in the
marketplace or, as it is often termed, "bargaining in the shadow of
the law."'"
Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Ti-
gard: Constitutional Rights As Public Goods, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 859 (1995).
6. The Takings Clause provides: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision was held applicable
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). State constitutions
contain similar or identical language guaranteeing protection against takings of private
property. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2, at 588 n.2
(2d ed. 1988).
7. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91; see also Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37 (referring to the
"nexus" test).
8. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837; see also infra notes 46-58 and accompanying text
(discussing Nollan).
9. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391-96; see also infra notes 59-93 and accompanying text
(discussing Dolan and comparing it with Nollan).
10. The Supreme Court continues to endorse deferential judicial review of regulatory
prohibitions on new development. For a discussion of the divergence between the Su-
preme Court's development conditions and development prohibitions jurisprudence, see
infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text. Some of this Article's objections to
nexus/rough proportionality scrutiny of development conditions might not apply in a legal
regime in which development prohibitions also were subject to serious judicial scrutiny.
See infra text accompanying note 191-92 (discussing the adoption of heightened scrutiny
of development prohibitions as a response to the inefficiencies that heightened scrutiny of
development conditions otherwise might generate).
11. Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
1246 [Vol. 75
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Because the Article's argument builds on the concepts of
"allocative efficiency" and "allocatively efficient development condi-
tions," those concepts warrant some introductory discussion. A new
development represents an efficient allocation of societal resources
if, and only if, the development will generate greater total social
benefits than total social costs. 2 Allocatively efficient development
conditions are conditions that require developers to internalize the
net social costs of their development projects. 3 Such social cost in-
ternalization is necessary to ensure that developers will proceed only
with projects that are expected to generate greater total social bene-
fits than costs.
This view regarding social cost internalization is based on the as-
sumption that local regulators have incomplete information such that
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982). See generally Victor P. Goldberg
et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condem-
nation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1083 (1987); Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
12. This Article employs a Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency whereby a transaction
is efficient if "the dollar value of the gains to the winners is greater than the dollar cost of
the losses to the losers." WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 16 (1987) (discussing the Kaldor-Hicks concept of efficiency);
see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-14 (4th ed. 1992). Pos-
ner provides the following example:
[i]n the ... concept of efficiency.., called the Kaldor-Hicks concept ... if A
values ... [a] wood carving at $5 and B at $12, so that at a sale price of
$10 ... the transaction creates a total benefit of $7... then it is an efficient
transaction, provided that the harm (if any) done to third parties (minus any
benefit to them) does not exceed $7.
Id.
13. See Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justice and
the Siting Of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 1045-46 (1993).
More precisely, developers should be required to internalize the lesser of (1) the costs to
current residents of simply bearing the negative effects of new development; and (2) the
costs to current residents of taking effective measures to avoid those negative effects.
This "lesser of" measure avoids creating perverse incentives for current residents. Con-
sider Professor Vicki Been's example:
Assume, for example, that a particular neighborhood is ideal for a toxic waste
dump because of its superior geological characteristics. Further assume that the
dump will cause $100,000 of damage to the immediate neighbor, if that neighbor
continues to behave as usual. No damage will result, however, if the neighbor
takes simple precautionary measures costing $1000. Unless limited to $1000,
compensation for damages would be socially inefficient because it would give
the neighbor no incentive to be the least cost avoider.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
For simplicity of presentation, the discussion and examples in this Article assume ei-
ther that the neighbors of proposed new development cannot take effective measures to
avoid the negative effects of new development or that avoidance measures would be more
costly for the neighbors than simply bearing the negative effects of new development.
1997] 1247
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they can accurately assess the negative monetary value current resi-
dents assign to proposed development, but not the positive monetary
value the developer assigns to proposed development.1 4 Under con-
ditions of complete information, regulators could discourage
inefficient development simply by denying development permission
in those cases in which current residents valued stopping develop-
ment more highly than the developer valued proceeding with
development. Under conditions of incomplete information, regula-
tors must rely on development conditions to ensure that developers
do not proceed with development that will decrease current resi-
dents' welfare by more than it will increase the developer's (and by
extension, future residents') welfare.15
Parts 116 and H1"7 of the Article provide an overview of the law
and politics of development conditions. Part II118 explains how judi-
cial review of development conditions under a nexus/rough
proportionality standard might result in the invalidation of alloca-
tively efficient development conditions. New development
sometimes generates social costs-or negative externalities-that de-
velopers or the government cannot mitigate or can mitigate only at
extraordinary expense. The nexus and rough proportionality tests
seem to require courts to invalidate development conditions that
governments impose in response to such impossible or hard-to-
mitigate negative externalities. From an allocative efficiency per-
spective, however, governments should require new development to
internalize the dollar-equivalent cost of its net negative externalities,
even if those externalities are impossible or difficult to mitigate.
14. For further discussion of this assumption, see infra notes 173-76 and accompany-
ing text.
15. The Article also assumes that substantial transaction costs might prevent current
residents and developers from bargaining successfully over whether a proposed develop-
ment project will proceed. The Coase Theorem predicts that, in the absence of
transaction costs, developers would undertake only net socially beneficial projects be-
cause current residents would simply purchase a developer's entitlement to build
whenever the current residents valued stopping proposed development more highly than
the developer valued proceeding with proposed development. See generally LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 12, at 31 ("The theorem holds that the efficiency with which re-
sources will be employed is unaffected by the initial assignment of rights, provided that
transaction costs are zero."). When bargaining between current residents and developers
entails substantial transaction costs, current residents might fail to buy the right to stop
development even when they valued stopping development more than the developer val-
ued proceeding with development.
16. See infra notes 22-106 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 107-37 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 138-59 and accompanying text.
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Part IV19 of the Article examines how local regulators' efforts to
circumvent the nexus/rough proportionality requirements also may
reduce allocative efficiency in land markets. Facing the prospect that
courts will strike down "excessive" development conditions under a
nexus/rough proportionality standard, states and localitiese may deny
development permission altogether in cases in which they previously
would have granted conditional permission. Nexus/rough propor-
tionality review thus may produce greater over-regulation of new
development than previously would have occurred-that is, no de-
velopment at all rather than merely excessively-conditioned
development.
Localities also may circumvent judicial scrutiny by choosing to
make deals only with developers with whom they have a long-term,
repeat transaction relationship. Such developers would be loathe to
challenge any development conditions in court because doing so
might undermine their ongoing relationships with local officials. A
notable effect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in land use,
therefore, may be the creation of a barrier to entry to new or outside
developers in local land markets. That is a result no one-other than
perhaps locally well-connected developers-could welcome.
Nexus/rough proportionality review, of course, offers possible
social benefits. Such review sometimes may produce greater effi-
ciency in land development markets. This is particularly likely to be
the case where new development is expected to generate net positive
externalities for the regulating jurisdiction." The possible benefits of
nexus/rough proportionality review, however, should be balanced
against the possible costs. The purpose of this Article is to contribute
19. See infra notes 160-96 and accompanying text.
20. The Article focuses on localities because localities are responsible for imposing
the great bulk of development conditions. See Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint On
Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 473, 473 n.2 (1991) (noting that "local governments are responsible for the vast
majority of all exactions"). Similarly, the Article focuses on professional developers be-
cause most conditions are imposed upon them, rather than upon "ordinary" landowners
who simply want to build a structure on their land for personal use. See id. at 476 n.19
(noting that "[m]ost exactions are levied against developers").
21. Two of my criticisms of nexus/rough proportionality review-that it may result in
judicial invalidation of allocatively efficient development conditions and more frequent
development prohibitions-apply to net negative externality development but not, as a
general matter, to net positive externality development. See infra notes 140-44 and ac-
companying text. However, my third criticism of nexus/rough proportionality review-
that such review may result in increased regulatory discrimination against new or un-
known developers-applies to both types of development. See infra notes 173-76 and
accompanying text.
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to our understanding of those possible costs.
I. THE LAW OF DEVELOPMENT REGULATION: FROM DEFERENCE
TO NEXUS/ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
States and localities employ a wide range of tools to regulate
proposed new development. At a very general level, however, these
tools fall into two categories. First, localities simply can prohibit cer-
tain sorts of new development at certain sites; this type of regulation
will be referred to as development prohibitions. Such prohibitions
are extremely common, and they have been regarded as presump-
tively constitutional since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'
Second, localities can regulate new development by imposing
certain conditions on their grants of permission to develop. This sort
of regulation is sometimes referred to as "development exactions,"
but this Article will employ the broader term "development condi-
tions." Development conditions take three principal forms: on-site
developer dedications, off-site developer dedications, and impact
fees.24 On-site developer dedications require the developer to build
some piece of public infrastructure or provide some public service at
or adjacent to the development site as a precondition for receiving
development permission. For example, developers are commonly
required to build or enhance public access roads for new develop-
ments.' On-site requirements of this sort are the most well-
established and least contested form of development condition. 6
Off-site dedications require the developer to build infrastructure
22. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). In Euclid, the Court upheld a comprehensive zoning plan
that prohibited the plaintiff from building residential and commercial buildings on its
undeveloped land. See id. at 396-97. Shortly after Euclid, "the Supreme Court went out
of the zoning business for nearly half a century." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.
KRIER, PROPERTY 1005 (3d ed. 1993).
23. Different commentators employ different terminology, and the distinctions
among regulatory devices sometimes blur in practice. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSI
A. GOMEZ-IBA&Ez, REGULATION FOR REVENUE 3-6 (1993) (discussing the distinction
between development exactions and more traditional forms of land use regulation).
24. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exac-
tions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 7-9, 16-19 (1987) (describing these three different
forms of development conditions).
25. See Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees:
A Survey of American Practices, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51, 58 (1987) (reporting on
the prevalence of on-site dedications for roads).
26. See THOMAS P. SNYDER & MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, PAYING FOR THE GROWTH:
USING DEVELOPMENT FEES TO FINANCE INFRASTRUCTURE 24 (1986).
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or provide public service at some site other than the development
site.2 For example, a developer who wants to build high-income
housing on one side of a town might be required to construct low-
income housing on another side of town as a condition for receiving
permission to build the high-income housing. Off-site requirements
have become increasingly common.28
Finally, rather than requiring the developer to do some work or
perform some activity as a development condition, a locality can re-
quire the developer simply to pay money as a precondition for
receiving development permission. Such monies are typically called
impact fees. Impact fees are not as widely employed as on-site or
off-site dedications, although in certain fast-growing jurisdictions
they are central to the development regulation regime and may even
account for a substantial portion of the cost of new residential units.4 o
Two common contexts for the imposition of development condi-
tions are requests for rezoning permissions and requests for special
use permits. Under traditional Euclidean zoning, each parcel in a
locality is zoned for certain specified uses as part of a comprehensive
or master plan; typically, residential uses are clustered together, as
are commercial and industrial uses.31 In localities that still formally
adhere to such zoning, developers often find that an economically
viable development plan for a certain parcel conflicts with the current
zoning code. Developers, therefore, often must receive rezoning
permissions to proceed with their projects. Other jurisdictions have
explicitly disavowed Euclidean zoning in favor of more flexible re-
gimes. Under the special use permit regime, for example, all major
development requires a special permit from zoning regulators. Those
regulators operate on the basis of community guidelines for the over-
all mix of uses the community wishes to achieve, rather than a
specific zoning map for each particular parcel.
27. See id. at 25.
28. See Smith, supra note 24, at 7-9 (discussing off-site dedications).
29. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAfREZ, supra note 23, at 3 (defining impact fees).
30. See Charles E. Connerly, Impact Fees as Social Policy: What Should Be Done?, in
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES: POLICY RATIONALE, PRACTICE, THEORY, AND ISSUES
362, 362-64 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES]
(reporting that impact fees account for between approximately $2,000 to $10,000 of the
average cost of a new dwelling in states such as California, Colorado, and Florida).
31. For a general description of Euclidean or "cumulative" zoning, see ROBERT M.
ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 9.14,9.38 (2d ed. 1976).
32. See MIKE E. MILES ET AL., REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT: PRINCIPLES AND
PROCESS 263-66 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the role of exactions in the rezoning process).
33. For descriptions of such flexible zoning regimes, see ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-
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Local regulators' statutory discretion as to when they can impose
development conditions and what development conditions can be
imposed varies by jurisdiction. In some jurisdictions, state and local
ordinances dictate with considerable specificity the types and content
of conditions that can be imposed under different circumstances.3' In
other jurisdictions, state and local statutes delegate virtually unfet-
tered discretion to regulators to negotiate particular development
conditions packages with developers.35 However, even in those juris-
dictions there may be norms regarding the conditions that are
appropriate for different types of projects.'
State courts generally have rejected claims that localities ex-
ceeded their statutory authority in imposing development
conditions.37 As a matter of state constitutional law, the courts in a
few states have held that development conditions may be imposed
only when they respond to community problems that are "specifically
and uniquely" attributable to the development in question. 8 Most
IBARIEZ, supra note 23, at 54-55; MILES ET AL., supra note 32, at 254-64; Judith Welch
Wegner, Moving Toward The Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agree-
ments, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV.
957, 977-82 (1987); see also Elizabeth A. Deakin, The Politics of Exactions, in PRIVATE
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES: EVALUATION OF REAL ESTATE EXACTIONS, LINKAGE,
AND ALTERNATIVE LAND POLICIES 96, 97-98 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988) [hereinafter
PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES] (noting the multitude of state approaches to
determining when exactions may apply to development projects and that exactions may
apply routinely to all development projects).
34. For a comprehensive review of the differences among state statutes regarding
impact fees, see Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee
Enabling Legislation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS 60, 61-77
(Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995).
35. For descriptions of the widespread use of negotiated development conditions, see
Joseph E. Coomes, Jr., Practical Concerns in Drafting and Negotiating Development
Agreements, in DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY AND PROSPECTS 133,
133-47 (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh eds., 1989); Richard H. Cowart, Negotiat-
ing Exactions Through Development Agreements, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC
SERVICES, supra note 33, at 219, 219-20; Deakin, supra note 33, at 104-05; Robert H.
Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing Valid Development Exac-
tions: Responding to Nollan, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS, supra
note 34, at 21, 30.
36. See SNYDER & STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 77 (noting the existence of "informal
guidelines that are used by planning and public works department staffs to determine
what is required from developers").
37. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 7-8 (Cal. 1949) (upholding exaction
dedication requirement); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W. 2d 442, 449-50
(Wis. 1965) (upholding development fee as constitutional); see also John J. Delaney et al.,
The Needs-Nexus Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User
Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146-56 (1987) (reviewing the
relevant case law and outlining the various judicial tests regarding the constitutionality of
land dedication regulations).
38. See, eg., Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d
[Vol. 751252
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jurisdictions, however, have opted for either a "reasonable relation-
ship" test or a "rational nexus" test, both of which, in practice,
require nothing more than some sort of cognizable relationship be-
tween development conditions and the adverse community impacts
that the development is expected to create.3 ' This "loose" standard
for review rarely has resulted in the invalidation of development
conditions.'
This Part addresses the federal constitutional law of develop-
ment conditions, beginning with an analysis of Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission4' and Dolan v. City of Tigard.4 It then compares
those cases to Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council43 in order to
underscore the sharp divergence between the Supreme Court's de-
velopment conditions and development prohibitions jurisprudence.
A. Nollan and Dolan
Richard Epstein has characterized federal land use jurisprudence
before Nollan as a "uniform line of cases ... begin[ning] with a nar-
row interpretation of the taking language, which is then bolstered by
an expansive interpretation of the police power." 44 In his view, the
cases merge "doctrinal error with an indefensible deference to local
government." 45  Whatever one may think of Epstein's normative
characterization of the case law, it clearly captures the bottom-line
dynamics of land use litigation before Nollan: Local governments
799, 802 (111. 1961) (striking down a requirement that the developer build recreational and
educational facilities in return for subdivision approval because the "record does not es-
tablish that the need for [the] facilities is one that is specifically and uniquely attributable
to the addition of the subdivision"). The states that apply this stricter standard of consti-
tutional scrutiny for development conditions "are not rapidly growing and therefore do
not have to cope with problems of rapid growth." James C. Nicholas, Impact Exactions:
Economic Theory, Practice, and Incidence, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 85, 95 (1987).
39. See Delaney et al., supra note 37, at 148-49, 152-54.
40. In particular, reasonableness review in California has been "very generously
weighted" in favor of the locality. Smith, supra note 24, at 12. For extended discussions
of the state constitutional jurisprudence of development conditions and the three princi-
pal tests, see Delaney et al., supra note 37, at 147-56; see also David L. Callies & Malcolm
Grant, Paying for Growth and Planning Gain: An Anglo-American Comparison of De-
velopment Conditions, Impact Fees, and Development Agreements, in EXACTIONS,
IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS, supra note 34, at 357, 364-66 (discussing the rational
nexus, reasonable relationship, and specifically and uniquely attributable tests as applied
to development conditions).
41. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
42. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
43. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
44. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 273 (1985).
45. Id.
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won, aggrieved property owners lost.
In Nollan, the Supreme Court departed from its tradition of def-
erence toward local land use regulators. The Nollans owned a
beachfront lot in Ventura, California, which contained a small bun-
galow that the Nollans wanted to demolish and replace with a larger
house.' Under California law, the redevelopment project required a
permit from the California Coastal Commission.' The Commission
granted the permit to the Nollans subject to the condition that they
grant the public an easement allowing the public to walk from a pub-
lic beach area on one side of the property to a public beach area on
the other side. In making this determination, the Commission ex-
plained that the easement would offset the burden created by the
new house:
[T]he new house would increase blockage of the view of the
ocean, thus contributing to the development of "a 'wall' of resi-
dential structures" that would prevent the public
"psychologically 
... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists
nearby that they have every right to visit." The new house
would also increase private use of the shorefront. These effects
of construction of the house, along with other area development,
would cumulatively "burden the public's ability to traverse to
and along the shorefront."
In imposing the easement condition, the Coastal Commission
was following its standard practice. The Commission "similarly con-
ditioned 43 out of 60 coastal development permits along the same
tract of land ... . [O]f the 17 not so conditioned, 14 had been ap-
proved when the Commission did not have administrative regulations
in place allowing imposition of the condition, and the remaining 3
had not involved shorefront property. 49 The Nollans nonetheless
challenged the easement condition, arguing that it constituted a tak-
ing of private property without just compensation. The California
Court of Appeal rejected this challenge, holding that the easement
condition was constitutional because it advanced the public purpose
of encouraging public beach access and did not deprive the Nollans of
all reasonable use of their property."0
46. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
47. See id. (citing CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 30106,30212,30600 (West 1986)).
48. Id. at 828-29 (summarizing the California Coastal Commission's findings)
(citations omitted).
49. Id. at 829 (citing the California Coastal Commission's findings) (citations omit-
ted).
50. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30 (Ct. App. 1986),
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The United States Supreme Court reversed. The majority opin-
ion, authored by Justice Scalia, 1 emphasized that if the state had
simply ordered the Nollans to open up part of their land to the public
without compensating them, the order would have violated the Tak-
ings Clause." But the opinion also recognized that if the Coastal
Commission had denied the building permit on the grounds that the
Nollans' new house would create a psychological barrier to public use
of the beachfront or add to beachfront congestion, the denial would
have been a constitutional exercise of the police power.53 For the
Court, the case thus presented a classic "unconstitutional conditions"
question: whether the state should be prevented from achieving indi-
rectly what it is forbidden from achieving directly (using the threat of
a development permission denial to secure a "free" public easement
that could not have been seized outright) or, alternatively, whether
the state's greater power to deny a discretionary government benefit'
(here, development permission) necessarily implies its lesser power
to place conditions on the grant of that benefit.'
According to the majority opinion, the Coastal Commission's
easement condition violated the Takings Clause because it "utterly
fail[ed] to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohi-
bition."56 In the Court's view,
[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement
that people already on the public beaches be able to walk
across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to view-
ing the beach created by the new house. It is also
impossible to understand how it lowers any "psychological
barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to rem-
edy any additional congestion on them caused by
rev'd, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
51. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined the
majority opinion. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827. Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
each filed dissenting opinions. See id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 865
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 831.
53. See id. at 835-36.
54. In the majority opinion in Nollan, however, Justice Scalia concluded that "the
right to build on one's own property... cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental
benefit.'" Id. at 833 n.2. This statement suggests that for Justice Scalia, developmental
rights are in some sense rooted in natural law and hence are not properly subject to any
legislative redefinition or adjustment.
55. For an interesting review and critique of the greater-includes-the-lesser argument
in constitutional law, see Brooks R. Fudenberg, Unconstitutional Conditions and Greater
Powers: A Separability Approach, 43 UCLA L. REv. 371 (1995).
56. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
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construction of the Nollans' new house."
In other words, the Court's unconstitutional conditions doctrine re-
quires that a development condition reduce or mitigate the problem
that otherwise would have permitted regulators to deny development
permission altogether. Development conditions that fail to meet the
"essential nexus" requirement are nothing more than "out-and-out
... extortion."
58
Nollan's nexus requirement does not speak to the question of
how much a constitutionally permissible development condition must
reduce the problem that otherwise would have permitted regulators
to deny development permission altogether. The Supreme Court
took up that issue seven years later in Dolan v. City of Tigard. In
Dolan, Florence Dolan wanted to redevelop a parcel that included a
floodplain area adjacent to a creek. Her development plans included
razing her existing hardware store, building a new store twice the size
of the original and another structure, and paving new parking areas.Y
Dolan's property was located in the congested Central Business Dis-
trict of the City of Tigard."
At the time Dolan applied for the permissions necessary to re-
develop her site, the City of Tigard had in place codified standards
for new building permits in the Central Business District. The Com-
munity Development Code provided, in relevant part, that
"[w]here ... development is allowed within and adjacent to
the ... floodplain, the city shall require the dedication of
sufficient open land area for greenway adjoining and within
the floodplain. This area shall include portions at a suitable
elevation for the construction of a pedestrian/bicycle path-
way ... n62
Consistent with the Code provisions, the City Planning Commission
granted Dolan's application for redevelopment permission subject to
two conditions. The first condition was that she dedicate a portion of
her property lying within the floodplain for use as a natural space or
greenway ("the greenway condition"); the second was that she dedi-
57. Ic- at 838-39.
58. Id. at 837 (citations omitted). In a footnote, Justice Scalia suggested that nexus
review is meant to be significantly more demanding than the rational basis review nor-
mally applied to economic legislation. See id. at 835 n.3.
59. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
60. See id. at 379.
61. See id.
62. 1& (quoting TIGARD, OR., COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE § 18.120.180.A.8;
Respondent's Brief, app. B, at B-45 to B-46, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
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cate an additional fifteen-foot strip adjacent to the floodplain as a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway ("the bicycle path condition").' The
Commission justified the greenway condition on the ground that "the
'anticipated increased storm water flow from the subject property to
an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the
public need to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drain-
age purposes.' "6' As to the bicycle path, the Commission found that
its construction could " 'offset some of the traffic demand ... and
lessen the increase in traffic congestion' "that the larger store other-
wise might generate."
Dolan applied for a variance from the City Planning Commis-
sion's decision." The Community Development Code provided
specific criteria for variances including, among other things, a show-
ing of" 'undue or unnecessary hardship.' ,67 The variance provisions
also allowed applicants to propose alternative measures that would
mitigate the expected impacts of new development."8 Dolan pro-
posed no such measures, and her application for a variance was
denied.69 The Oregon Court of Appeals subsequently rejected Do-
lan's challenge to the greenway and bicycle path conditions,
concluding that both conditions satisfied Nollan's essential nexus re-
quirement."
The United States Supreme Court reversed.7 The majority
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, did not question the
Commission's prerogative to deny a redevelopment permit in order
to prevent increased sewer runoff or traffic congestion.' Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion also acknowledged that the greenway and
63. Id at 380 & n.2.
64. Id at 382 (citing TIGARD, OR., Planning Commission Final Order No. 91-09 PC;
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, app. G, at G-37, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
65. 1&
66. See id. at 380.
67. Id. (citing TIGARD, OR., COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CODE § 18.134.010; Re-
spondent's Brief, app. B, at B-47, Dolan (No. 93-518)).
68. See id at 380-81.
69. See id. Nor did Dolan's variance application address the nature or magnitude of
the potential adverse impacts of her development project. See Respondent's Brief at 10-
12, Dolan (No. 93-518).
70. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443-44 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 374
(1994).
71. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 396.
72. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the majority opinion.
See id. at 375. Justices Stevens and Souter each filed a dissenting opinion. See id. at 396
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 411 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. See id. at 387.
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bicycle path conditions bore a nexus to the regulatory ends of con-
trolling sewer runoff and congestion, and that the conditions
therefore satisfied the Nollan nexus requirement.7 The Court held,
however, that, in addition to satisfying a nexus test, a development
condition must satisfy a "rough proportionality" test. This test-
which the Court maintained is similar to tests previously adopted by
a number of state courts76-- requires land use regulators to establish,
by means of "some sort of individualized determination," that the
required condition is "related both in nature and extent to the impact
of the proposed development."' It is the locality, not the developer,
that bears the burden of proof in court.78
Applying the rough proportionality requirement, the Court held
that the greenway condition was disproportionately burdensome be-
cause it required Dolan to cede title to the greenway area even
though that transfer in itself did nothing to advance the public pur-
pose of preventing sewer runoff.79 Dolan, however, had never voiced
any interest in retaining ownership of the area designated as a green-
way; her objection to the greenway condition was that she did not
74. See id. at 386-88.
75. Id. at 391.
76. See id at 390-91 (suggesting that the rough proportionality test resembles the
tests adopted by the courts in Nebraska, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Texas, and Utah). In his
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the majority's rough proportionality requirement
lacks any significant support in state court constitutional jurisprudence. See id. at 398
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Not one of the state cases cited by the Court announces any-
thing akin to a 'rough proportionality' requirement."). Some commentators agree with
Justice Stevens. See, e.g., Julian R. Kossow, Dolan v. City of Tigard, Takings Law, and
the Supreme Court" Throwing the Baby Out with the Floodwater, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
216, 231-32 & n.86 (1995); Suzanna Glover-Ettrich, Note, A Newly-Minted Hurdle for
City Planners: Dolan v. City of Tigard, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 559, 586 (1995). Others
believe that Nollan and Dolan are consistent with at least some precedents of some state
courts. See, e.g., Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek, Public Improvements and the
Nexus Factor: The Takings Equation after Dolan v. City of Tigard, in EXACTIONS,
IMPACr FEES, AND DEDICATIONS, supra note 34, at 3, 9-11.
77. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The rationale the Court offered for the rough propor-
tionality requirement amounts to the following: "We see no reason why the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the Bill of Rights as the First Amend-
ment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor relation in ...
comparable circumstances." Id. at 392. As Professor Merrill notes, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion "fail[s] to supply a cogent explanation for why it was ... necessary to go beyond a
mere requirement of essential nexus and demand a showing of rough proportionality be-
tween a waiver of rights and stated government purposes." Merrill, supra note 5, at 869.
78. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91. Justice Stevens pointedly criticized the majority's
departure from the usual rule that an aggrieved landowner bears the burden of proof in a
suit challenging a local land use regulation. See id. at 403 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. See id at 393.
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want that area of the parcel to be maintained as a greenway at all.'
She simply wanted to develop that area of the parcel for her own pri-
vate business purposes. Thus, the Dolan majority opinion appears to
have fabricated an objection to the greenway condition and then de-
clared the fabricated objection persuasive.
The Court's analysis of the "rough proportionality" of the bicy-
cle path condition is somewhat less disingenuous and hence more
revealing. The Court noted that "the city [had] estimate[d] that the
proposed development would generate roughly 435 additional [car]
trips per day," and that "[d]edications for streets, sidewalks, and
other public ways are generally reasonable exactions to avoid exces-
sive congestion from a proposed property use."8  The Court
concluded, however, that "the city ha[d] not met its burden of dem-
onstrating that the additional number of vehicle and bicycle trips
generated by the petitioner's development reasonably relate to the
city's requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian/bicycle pathway
easement."'  In the Court's view, the finding that the easement
"could offset" some congestion was insufficient: "[T]he city must
make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication
for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway ... ."' The Court thus suggested
that some reduction of congestion could justify the bicycle path, al-
though it left open the critical question of whether, for example, a ten
or twenty or even fifty percent reduction in congestion resulting from
the new store would be sufficient justification for burdening Dolan
with the bicycle path condition.
In addition to the question of how courts should assess whether
the benefits of development conditions are roughly proportionate to
the burdens they impose on landowners, Dolan leaves open substan-
tial questions about the scope of cases to which the nexus/rough
proportionality tests apply. Notably, language in both Nollan and
Dolan suggests that the Court intends the nexus/rough proportional-
ity requirements to apply only to development conditions that entail
landowners actually ceding land interests to the state.84 Recognizing
80. See id. at 404 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, Florence Dolan apparently de-
clined the option of a permit in which she would retain title to the area restricted for use
as a greenway. See id. (citation omitted).
81. Id. at 395.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 395-96.
84. See, e.g., id at 385 (noting that "the conditions imposed were not simply a limita-
tion on the use petitioner might make of her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed
portions of the property to the city"); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
841 (1987) ("We are inclined to be particularly careful ... where the actual conveyance of
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that development conditions may be severely burdensome to land-
owners regardless of their form, a number of state courts nonetheless
have construed Nollan and Dolan to apply to all sorts of development
conditions, including monetary fees. The Supreme Court's remand
in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City---a case in which the state court had
upheld a development fee--seems to support this broad interpreta-
tion of Nollan and Dolan."
A few state courts have interpreted the nexus/rough proportion-
ality requirements as applicable when land use regulators have used
their discretion to tailor development conditions for specific projects,
but inapplicable when regulators imposed conditions pursuant to
rigid or formulaic government policies or ordinances, such as an or-
dinance that dictates particular road and sewer dedications for
projects of different magnitudes.' This narrow reading of Nollan and
property is made a condition to the lifting of a land-use restriction."). Some courts have
interpreted the nexus and rough proportionality tests as applicable only to land dedication
requirements. See, e.g., Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874
(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the nexus test applies only where "regulations ... constitute
a physical encroachment on land").
85. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 438-39 (Cal.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 299 (1996) (applying rough proportionality test to development fees); Northern
Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-90 (Ill. 1995)
(applying rough proportionality test to development fees); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (applying rough proportionality test to fee paid in
lieu of an open space dedication requirement); Building Indus. Ass'n v. City of Oxnard,
267 Cal. Rptr. 769, 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the nexus test to development
fees); Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't v. Schneider, 849 S.W.2d 557, 559-60 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1992) (applying the nexus test to a condition requiring the developer to fund the
construction of a bridge).
86. 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (mem.).
87. In Ehrlich, the California Court of Appeal had upheld a city's imposition of ap-
proximately $300,000 in fees on a landowner as a condition of granting development
permission. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 483 (Ct. App. 1993),
vacated, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (mem.). One day after deciding Dolan, the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and then vacated and remanded the California Court of
Appeal's opinion for proceedings consistent with the decision in Dolan. See Ehrlich, 512
U.S. 1231 (1994) (mem.). The remand may signal that the Court intends the nexus/rough
proportionality tests to extend to monetary development conditions.
88. Moreover, unless nexus/rough proportionality review is deemed to extend to both
non-monetary and monetary conditions, such review may lack any practical significance.
If nexus/rough proportionality review applied only to non-monetary conditions, states and
localities could rely on monetary conditions to reach the same objectives they previously
achieved by means of non-monetary conditions. In a case like Nollan, for example, the
government could set a monetary condition or fee for its development permission equal
to the fair market value of a public access easement, and then use the fee money to fund
the acquisition of the easement by eminent domain. But see infra note 163 (noting that
courts might not permit localities to use their eminent domain power to avoid
nexus/rough proportionality review).
89. See, e.g., Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 439 (holding that Nollan and Dolan apply only to
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Dolan assimilates those cases into a body of state zoning law juris-
prudence that is suspicious of individual regulators' exercises of
discretion.' Other state courts implicitly or explicitly have rejected
this narrow interpretation.9' That rejection is well-founded; as
stated above, both Nollan and Dolan involved the straightforward
application of general policies or statutes to specific parcels rather
than individual regulators' exercise of case-specific discretion.93
the "discretionary deployment of the police power"); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of
Scottsdale, 902 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (refusing to apply the nexus/rough
proportionality test to development fees that are "standardized and uniform" so that "a
prospective developer may know precisely the fee that will be charged").
90. For an excellent analysis of this tradition, see Carol M. Rose, Planning and Deal-
ing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L. REV. 837,
857-67 (1983) (reviewing academic and judicial hostility toward ad-hoc, case-by-case deci-
sion-making regarding local land use development). The most famous case in this
tradition is Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). The
Fasano court held that small-scale rezonings by a local government authority may consti-
tute adjudicative rather than legislative acts and thus may not warrant the traditional
judicial deference accorded legislation. See id. at 25-30.
91. For examples of cases applying nexustrough proportionality review outside the
context of case-by-case, discretionary decision-making, see Northern Ill. Home Builders
Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-90 (Ill. 1995) (applying rough propor-
tionality test to development fees imposed pursuant to formulas set out in county
ordinances); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 482-85 (N.Y. 1994)
(applying nexus test to a state statute requiring landlords to offer lease renewals to non-
profit hospitals), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1961 (1995); Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 877
P.2d 187, 194 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (applying rough proportionality review to fee in lieu
of dedication imposed pursuant to a formula set out in county ordinances); Kottschade v.
City of Rochester, 537 N.W.2d 301,307-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (applying rough propor-
tionality test to land dedication requirement applied pursuant to a city ordinance).
92. The narrow interpretation of Nollan and Dolan, while probably insupportable as
a matter of interpretation, may make some sense as a matter of policy. By limiting
nexus/rough proportionality review to development conditions that were not imposed
pursuant to formulaic statutes or government policies, courts would encourage localities
to rely more heavily on formulaic statutes or government policies in imposing conditions.
Such statutes and policies may offer developers more ex ante certainty regarding the cost
of prospective development projects; greater certainty, in turn, may facilitate socially
productive investments by developers. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery:
A Comment on Miche/man, 88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700-01 (1988) (making this argu-
ment). Certainty and consistency, in any event, are what many developers say they most
value in a regulatory regime. See, e.g., Douglas R. Porter, Will Developers Pay To Play?,
in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES, supra note 30, at 73, 76 (reporting that developers "may
yearn for the relative certainty of prestated fees"). Formulaic statutes and policies also
may help prevent undesirable discrimination by local regulators in favor of politically
well-connected developers and against other developers. See infra notes 193-96 and ac-
companying text (discussing how limits on individual regulators' discretion may temper
some of the possible perverse effects of nexus/rough proportionality review).
93. To be fair to the courts that have limited Dolan to discretionary, case-by-case
impositions of development conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion does state that
heightened review of the City of Tigard's development conditions was appropriate be-
cause "here the city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application
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B. The Comparison with Lucas
Five years after Nollan and two years before Dolan, the Su-
preme Court decided Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.9
Lucas involved a development prohibition rather than a conditional
grant of development permission.95 Commentators who identify a
general property-rights revival in the Supreme Court's recent takings
jurisprudence sometimes group Nollan and Dolan with Lucas.96 A
comparison of Nollan and Dolan with Lucas, however, underscores
the marked divergence in the Court's posture toward development
conditions and development prohibitions.
Lucas, like most Takings Clause cases, involved a situation in
which the rules of the development game changed after the plaintiff
landowner took title. Soon after David Lucas bought two beachfront
lots for approximately one million dollars, the South Carolina legisla-
ture enacted the Beachfront Management Act.9 That Act had the
effect of prohibiting Lucas from building any structure on the lots he
had purchased.98 The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of the development prohibition, reasoning that the
prohibition advanced the public purpose of controlling beach ero-
sion."
for a building permit on an individual parcel." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385
(1994). As Justice Souter noted in dissent, however, "[t]he majority characterizes this
case as involving an 'adjudicative decision' to impose permit conditions, but the permit
conditions were imposed pursuant to Tigard's Community Development Code. The ad-
judication here was of Dolan's requested variance from the permit conditions otherwise
required to be imposed by the Code." Id. at 413 n.* (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in a case that raised the issue of
whether Dolan's rough proportionality requirement applies to broadly-imposed, legisla-
tive requirements. See Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 115 S. Ct. 2268 (1995) (mem.)
(denying cert. to 450 S.E.2d 200 (Ga. 1994)). Justices Thomas and O'Connor dissented
from the denial of certiorari. See id. at 2268 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Jus-
tice Thomas urged the Court to resolve the split among the lower courts, arguing that
"[t]he distinction between sweeping legislative takings and particularized administrative
takings [is] a distinction without a constitutional difference." Id. at 2269 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
94. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
95. See id at 1007.
96. See, e.g., James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings Back Into the
Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 103, 135-36 (1996); James A. Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality
of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist
Court, 8 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 53,56-60 (1992).
97. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law Co-op.
amended 1990, 1993)).
98. See iL at 1007.
99. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991),
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The United States Supreme Court reversed.O3 The opinion,
authored by Justice Scalia, explained that just compensation gener-
ally is required when (1) a development prohibition is imposed after
the plaintiff landowner takes title to the property at issue; and (2) the
prohibition "denies all economically beneficial or productive use" of
the property,"' thereby virtually reducing the property's market value
to zero. Justice Scalia's opinion, as well as the other opinions in Lu-
cas, is consistent with the well-established principle that Takings
Clause limitations on uncompensated development prohibitions do
not apply when a party takes title to property already subject to a de-
velopment prohibition. In such cases, the purchase price for the
plaintiff's property presumably includes a discount for the develop-
ment prohibition."
By contrast, in Nollan and Dolan, the Court seemed to endorse
heightened scrutiny of development conditions that were part of the
established regulatory regime when the plaintiff took title. Neither
opinion indicates that the nexus/rough proportionality tests apply
only when a change occurs in the applicable development conditions
regime after the plaintiff acquires title. Indeed, in Nollan the Cali-
fornia Coastal Commission had established a practice of requiring
easement conditions before the Nollans took title.0 3 Likewise, in
Dolan the Court nowhere suggested that Dolan took title with the
reasonable expectation that the city would not place greenway or bi-
cycle path conditions on any permission she later might seek to
redevelop her site.
Nollan and Dolan, moreover, do not limit nexus/rough propor-
tionality review to cases where the burdens on landowners are so
severe as to qualify as a Lucas-type "total loss." Indeed, the Nollan
rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
100. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
101. Id. at 1015-16; id. at 1026-29. For analyses of Lucas, see David A. Dana, Natural
Preservation and the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 664-68 (1995) (criticizing
the reasoning in Lucas, but arguing that its limited guarantee of compensation may pre-
vent undesirable accelerated development of natural or open spaces); Joseph L. Sax,
Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1435-42 (1993) (discussing Justice Scalia's pro-
development conception of land).
102. Cf. Note, Condemnations, Implicit Benefits, and Collective Losses: Achieving Just
Compensation Through "Community," 107 HARV. L. REV. 696, 704 n.39 (1994) ("[T]he
price an owner paid for his property is often discounted for the risk of a future regulation
or condemnation. To the extent that there is such a price discount, the owner has been
compensated ex ante.").
103. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987)
(acknowledging that the Nollans "acquired the land well after the Commission had begun
to implement its policy").
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and Dolan majority opinions make no mention of the difference in
value of the Nollans' or Dolan's investments with and without the
challenged development conditions, 1"4 and there is no reason to be-
lieve those differences were substantial.' State case law is consistent
with the view that the nexus/rough proportionality requirements ap-
ply even when there has been no change in the applicable regulatory
regime and no claim of total, or even substantial, loss in market
value.116
II. JUDICIAL COMPETENCE, POLITICAL CORRUPTION, AND
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS
One question raised but not specifically addressed by the Nollan
and Dolan opinions is why courts should be concerned about devel-
opment conditions. Much of the standard academic literature
justifying the Takings Clause is inapplicable to Nollan and Dolan be-
cause that literature conceptualizes "the takings problem" as a
problem of transitions in legal regimes. According to this literature,
a requirement of just compensation is a means of providing citizens
with some security against losses due to changes in regulatory re-
gimes.07 Such security is important because otherwise risk-averse
investors will under-invest in the economy and overall social welfare
will not be maximized."8 This risk-aversion rationale for Takings
104. The Nollans's and Dolan's Supreme Court briefs did not even contain any argu-
ment regarding market value losses. See Brief for Petitioner, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994) (No. 93-518); Brief for Appellant, Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133).
105. Cf. Porter, supra note 92, at 77 (stating that development fees "usually amount to
a small percentage of total development costs" and "represent an irritant rather than a
fatal blow to a project").
106. As stated above, some state courts have construed Nollan and Dolan as applying
nexus/rough proportionality review only to circumstances where regulators exercised
discretion in tailoring conditions for particular parcels. See supra notes 89-90 and accom-
panying text. These courts have not held, however, that the plaintiff landowner must
show that, after she took title, there was a shift from a non-discretionary conditions re-
gime to a discretionary conditions regime or that individual regulators exercised their
discretion with respect to her parcel in a manner inconsistent with their past practice.
107. See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 753-56 (1994) (discussing possible ra-
tionales for Talings Clause compensation).
108. Professors Blume and Rubinfeld have provided a nuanced argument that com-
pensation may be necessary in order to prevent underinvestment in socially productive
activity. Their argument, in essence, relies on three propositions. First, they posit that
some participants in the market for land are risk averse-that is, they value risky invest-
ments at a lower value than risk-free investments that have the same expected value. See
Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 582-92 (1984). Second, they posit that risk aversion nor-
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Clause compensation cannot explain Nollan and Dolan because, as
previously discussed, those cases did not involve a transition or
change in applicable development regulations."109
Another strand in the academic literature-one that is arguably
applicable to Nollan and Dolan-conceives of the Takings Clause as
a response to distortions in the democratic political process. In this
account, the takings problem is not one of adjustment to regulatory
change-change that on its own terms might be fully justifiable-but
rather the ever-constant threat of political malfeasance and corrup-
tion. The focus of this literature is on distortions in the political
process that lead to excessive regulatory burdens on new develop-
ment.
10
This Part evaluates the argument that distortions in the demo-
cratic political process justify judicial policing of development
conditions. The Part first briefly explores the inherent difficulties in
ascertaining whether a particular development condition is alloca-
tively efficient, and concludes that judges may be no better
positioned-and arguably are less well-positioned-than local offi-
cials and regulators to grapple with these difficulties."' The Part then
examines two accounts of the democratic political process that sug-
mally generates a demand for risk-spreading through insurance and that, but for failures
in the insurance market, we would observe commercially available insurance against
regulatory diminutions in property value. Such insurance does not exist, they believe,
because of two "imperfection[s]" in the insurance market: "moral hazard," which "occurs
when the party to be insured can affect the probability or the magnitude of the event that
triggers payment," and "adverse selection," which "arises because insurers are not always
as accurate as policymakers in assessing the probabilities of the events they are insuring."
Id. at 592-97. Third, they propose that ex post compensation for regulatory losses can
serve as a substitute for insurance and thereby eliminate the under-investment that oth-
erwise would result from risk-averse investors' awareness of the existence of the risk of
uncompensated regulatory losses. In their view, ex post compensation solves the moral
hazard problem that would beset any scheme for ex ante insurance. See id. at 597-99. But
see Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REv. 509,
527-36 (1986) (criticizing this economic rationale for Takings Clause compensation and
arguing that compensation requirements may encourage overinvestment, rather than
underinvestment). But cf. Dana, supra note 101, at 681 (arguing that neither the Blume
and Rubinfeld model nor the Kaplow model take adequate account of how compensation
requirements or the absence thereof may affect the timing of development).
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42
CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 723 (1993) (discussing the view that a compensation requirement
is "a necessary and desirable check on the potential misuse by the legislature of its
authority over property rights"); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding
of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 867-78 (1995)
(exploring political process failure rationales for a constitutional compensation require-
ment).
111. See infra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
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gest contradictory conclusions as to whether judicial scrutiny of de-
velopment conditions is nonetheless justified."'
A. What Is Allocatively Efficient Development Regulation?
In order to assess whether a particular development condition is
allocatively efficient, five inquiries must be completed. First, it must
be determined which of the anticipated externalized effects of the
new development are legitimately labeled externalized social costs or
benefits. Second, "legitimate" externalized social costs and benefits
each must be measured. Third, the externalized social costs and
benefits must be offset against each other to arrive at a determination
of the net externalized social cost or net externalized social benefit.
Fourth, the cost to the developer resulting from the developmental
conditions at issue must be assessed. Finally, that cost must be com-
pared with any anticipated net externalized social costs of
development to determine whether the regulatory burdens on the
landowner equal the anticipated net externalized social costs of the
proposed development project.11 3
All of these inquiries involve difficult questions of judgment.
Social cost, like beauty, often is in the eye of the beholder; for exam-
ple, some may regard the introduction of a modern apartment
building into a historic district as a social cost in terms of historic
heritage and aesthetics, whereas others may regard it as a welcome
addition to an architecturally staid and dull neighborhood."4 Moreo-
ver, normative principles of non-discrimination may render certain
arguable social costs illegitimate for allocative efficiency considera-
tion. For example, low-income housing may well externalize more
costs onto a community than high-income housing because low-
income residents may require more local social services."5 Yet, while
112. See hifra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
113. In making this allocative efficiency assessment, localities also should credit the
new development for "taxes and other nonimpact fee payments that the ... development
may make over time and that would pay for the same facilities financed from fees." Mark
P. Barnebey et al., Paying for Growth: Community Approaches to Development Impact
Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACTFEES, supra note 30, at 37,50.
114. For discussions of aesthetic and historic preservation zoning, see Mark
Bobrowski, Scenic Landscape Protection Under the Police Power, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L.
REV. 697 (1995); John J. Costonis, Law and Aesthetics: A Critique and a Reformulation of
the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355 (1982).
115. Similarly, housing for large families may generate more social costs than housing
for small families or single people because large families place greater strains on educa-
tional resources. See Robert A. Blewett & Arthur C. Nelson, A Public Choice and
Efficiency Argument for Development Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES, Su-
pra note 30, at 281, 283-84 (noting that households with children create greater local
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a considerable degree of exclusionary zoning is in fact tolerated by
courts, 6 there are constitutional and, in some jurisdictions, statutory
limits on such zoning."
Even when no question exists as to the legitimacy of a locality's
concerns about the social costs of a particular project, difficulties may
arise in measuring those costs. Consider, for example, a Wal-Mart
proposed for construction on a large piece of open land. The Wal-
Mart presumably will impose certain costs on the community, in-
cluding increased noise and congestion from customers and the loss
of open space that may have provided the community with visual and
environmental benefits. On the other hand, the Wal-Mart also will
create positive externalities in the form of providing jobs for local
youth and retail services that otherwise might have been inaccessible
to many in the community."' None of these costs or benefits has an
obvious market or dollar value; a five percent increase in traffic con-
gestion conceivably could be valued as a $10,000 or a $100,000
equivalent in lost welfare. The loss of open space similarly could be
assigned a range of values."9 Yet to meaningfully assess the net social
financial burdens for localities, but "social equities" preclude differential taxation on that
basis).
The low-income housing example also highlights how the geographic distribution of
social costs and benefits complicates assessments of allocative efficiency. The construc-
tion of low-income housing in one community and the burdening of that community with
localized costs may mean that similar housing will not be built in another community and
that the second community will be spared the localized social costs of such a project. In
this sense, the construction of the low-income housing in the first community creates both
costs and benefits, yet the costs are borne solely by the first community and the benefits
solely by the second community. In the absence of some mechanism to require the sec-
ond community to compensate the first community, the first community quite
understandably may wish to regulate low-income housing as if it produces only social
costs. From a larger societal perspective, this may mean that the first community will try
to over-regulate new low-income housing.
116. For example, courts routinely uphold minimum lot-size requirements that limit
the availability of low and moderate income housing. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v.
Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956, 963 (1st Cir. 1972) (upholding minimum lot-size zon-
ing); Napro Co. v. Town of Cherry Hills Village, 504 P.2d 344, 348 (Colo. 1972) (same).
117. For discussions of constitutional and statutory limitations on exclusionary zoning
by localities, see Harold A. McDougall, From Litigation to Legislation in Exclusionary
Zoning Law, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 623 passim (1987) (discussing statutory limita-
tions on zoning laws in order to promote affordable low-income housing); Paul K.
Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening
the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 VA. L. REV. 535, 547-59 (1992) (discussing statu-
tory limitations).
118. For a report of the kind of heated political debate that arises when Wal-Mart
proposes the construction of a new store, see T.J. Quinn, Debate Brews As Centerville
Expands Development, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 25, 1994, at B1.
119. For discussions of the intractable problem of reducing environmental costs and
benefits to monetary terms, see David A. Dana, Setting Environmental Priorities: The
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costs or benefits of the proposed Wal-Mart, the locality, in theory,
must reduce each of the externalized costs and benefits to a common
metric, presumably dollars. Having done that much, if the commu-
nity wants to condition the grant of development permission on the
developer's commitment to, for example, provide in-kind services
such as road construction, then the cost of that condition to the de-
veloper must be assessed and compared to the anticipated net social
costs of the project.
Often, these estimates and comparisons will entail mere
"guesstimates" regarding the impact of development projects." A
standard explanation for the imposition of inefficiently lax develop-
ment conditions is that sophisticated developers sometimes mislead
unsophisticated local officials into holding the developers responsible
for lesser adverse community impacts than in fact will occur."' Con-
versely, one explanation for "excessive" development conditions is
that sophisticated regulators sometimes mislead unsophisticated de-
velopers into conceding responsibility for greater adverse community
impacts than in fact will occur.'" To the extent that under-regulation
or over-regulation of new development reflects differences in the so-
phistication of developers and local officials, the litigation process
and judicial review may not improve matters; those same differences
may be reproduced in the quality, and hence persuasiveness, of the
litigants' submissions to the court. The courts, moreover, arguably
Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365, 381-85 (1994) (reviewing
STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993)); Daniel A. Farber, Environmentalism, Economics, and the Public
Interest, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024-28 (1989) (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE
ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988)); Cf.
Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 795-
808 (1994) (discussing definitions of incommensurability).
120. As Justice Stevens explained in his dissent in Dolan, "[i]n our changing world one
thing is certain: uncertainty will characterize predictions about the impact of new urban
developments on the risks of floods, earthquakes, traffic congestion, or environmental
harms." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Robert H. Freilich & Terry D. Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing Valid De-
velopment Exactions: Responding to Nollan, in ExAcriONS, IMPACT FEES, AND
DEDICATIONS, supra note 34, at 21, 29 (noting the difficulty of quantifying the impacts of
new development).
121. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBA Il'EZ, supra note 23, at 58 ("Developers ... are
often more adept negotiators than local officials, particularly the officials of small and
medium-sized jurisdictions."); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS
188-89 (1985) (discussing the bargaining advantages of developers in negotiations with
local regulators).
122. See SNYDER & STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 78 (noting that "many smaller devel-
opers ... often depend upon the city to tell them what infrastructure they must provide to
gain local approval of their projects. These inexperienced developers are more likely to
make concessions that are not in their best interests .... ").
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stand at greater remove from the community than local officials or
regulators and hence may be less well-equipped to understand, for
example, the magnitude of the loss in community welfare that would
result from an increase in traffic congestion.
B. Political Distortions as a Justification for Judicial Review
Even if local officials are better equipped than judges to assess
allocative efficiency, they might not have the same incentive to do so
in a forthright manner. Where local politics are majoritarian, that is,
dominated by the numerical majority of citizens, local politicians may
seek to over-regulate new development. That is so because such
over-regulation may benefit the dominant political majority even
though it does not maximize the welfare of the community as a
whole. The bias toward over-regulation in local majoritarian politics
might justify judicial policing of "excessive" development conditions
notwithstanding the competency limitations of judges. 1 3
The "players" in the majoritarian account of over-regulation are
"ordinary" landowners who own undeveloped parcels and hope to
sell to developers in the near term, developers who already have
bought undeveloped parcels in the locality, future residents of the
community, and a politically dominant majority of current residents.
Landowners who wish to sell to developers in the near term will op-
pose development restrictions on their parcels because the
restrictions will lower the market price of the parcels. Similarly, de-
velopers who hold land obviously have an interest in persuading local
officials to allow as unconstrained development as possible. This is
true whether or not the developers bought their land with the expec-
tation that land development would be stringently regulated. 24
Where the cost of over-regulation will be borne in part by future
purchasers of developed units in the form of higher purchase prices,
these future purchasers also have an interest in combating over-
123. For analyses suggesting that majoritarian politics justify compensation require-
ments, see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND
POLITICS 204-07 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic
and LegalAnalysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385,405-07 (1977).
124. If a developer buys a parcel at a relatively high price and the applicable zoning is
then made more restrictive, she might lose money on her investment; this contingency
obviously is one the developer will work very hard to prevent. But even if the developer
purchased the parcel at a relatively low price with the expectation that only modest de-
velopment probably would be permitted, she still might decide to work to obtain
permission for intensive development. That permission then might result in greater prof-
its-windfall profits-than she (and the market) had assumed were likely when she
acquired title.
1997] 1269
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
regulation. Almost by definition, however, future purchasers will
constitute an inchoate and hence wholly ineffectual "group" until it is
too late-that is, until new development subject to excessive regula-
tory constraints has been completed."2 The sole voice against over-
regulation of a given parcel, therefore, may be that of the landowner
hoping to sell or, if that sale already has occurred, the developer."6
This voice, however, may be overwhelmed by the locality's po-
litical majority. Even when a new development project would create
no net negative externalities, a dominant local majority might seek to
prohibit it. For example, prohibitions on new housing development
in a locality restrict the supply of housing units that otherwise would
be available in the locality. Simple economic theory predicts that re-
strictions on the supply of a good such as housing will result in a
market increase in the price of the good (assuming unchanged de-
mand). By restricting the total supply of housing, a dominant local
majority of homeowners can increase the market value of their
homes.27 Alternatively, a dominant political majority might seek to
extract wealth from the new housing development in the form of de-
velopment conditions. That wealth could benefit the political
majority in the form of enhanced public services or infrastructure,
such as better roads or new parks, or lower taxes.
125. This may not be the case, however, if many of the prospective purchasers of new
housing units in a locality already live there and are active in local politics. See SNYDER
& STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 34, 97.
126. Even that voice may be muted when the developer anticipates that she will be
able to "pass along" the full cost of development conditions to future purchasers of de-
veloped units. See Timothy Beatley, Ethical Issues in the Use of Impact Fees to Finance
Community Growth, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES, supra note 30, at 339, 350
(explaining that "developers may not be as adamant in their opposition to impact fees if
they know that they can pass much of the cost along"). For general analyses of who bears
the costs of development exactions, see ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBAFJIEZ, supra note 23, at
97-106; Forrest E. Huffman et al., Who Bears the Burden of Development Impact Fees?,
54 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 49 (1988).
127. See Timothy J. Choppin, Breaking the Exclusionary Land Use Regulation Barrier:
Policies to Promote Affordable Housing in the Suburbs, 82 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2055 (1994)
("[C]urrent residents suffer few negative consequences from restrictive development
policies. In fact, the value of their homes may rise .. . ."); David G. Andersen, Comment,
Urban Blight Meets Municipal Manifest Destiny: Zoning at the Ballot Box, the Regional
Welfare, and Transferable Development Rights, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 519, 549 (1991)
(providing an example of a community's use of development prohibitions that resulted in
an increase in housing prices). For more theoretical treatments of the connections be-
tween growth restrictions and housing prices, see Dean J. Misczynski, Land-Use Controls
and Property Values, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS 75 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean J.
Misczynski eds., 1978); Michelle J. White, Fiscal Zoning in Fragmented Metropolitan Ar-
eas, in FISCAL ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS: THE ECONOMIC ISSUES 31 (Edwin S.
Mills & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1975).
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If we assume that the political majority rationally maximizes its
own welfare, that majority would need to (1) assess how much its
members would gain in the market value of their homes if the new
housing development were prohibited, and then (2) compare that
gain with the maximum gain that could be extracted from the devel-
oper by means of development conditions. For example, imagine
that the aggregate gain in housing value for current residents would
be $200,000 if the new housing development was prohibited. If the
developer would proceed with the project despite an impact fee in
excess of $200,000, then the dominant political majority would be
better off allowing conditional development. If the developer would
abandon the project with a required impact fee exceeding $200,000,
however, the dominant majority would be better off supporting a de-
velopment prohibition."l
There is no a priori reason to think that over-regulation via high
development conditions will be any more attractive to oppressive lo-
cal majorities than over-regulation via development prohibitions.
Consequently, it is not clear why courts would choose to scrutinize
conditional grants of development permission, while according great
deference to flat development prohibitions. 9
128. Alternatively, the majority could support an impact fee in excess of $200,000,
knowing that such a fee would have the same effect as a prohibition.
129. Moreover, even if development politics generally are dominated by greedy local
majorities, and even if those majorities ideally would like to impose excessive develop-
ment conditions, competition among localities may prevent the imposition of such
conditions. As Professor Been has cogently explained, developers can pit localities com-
peting for new development against each other by threatening to shift capital from
localities that impose excessive conditions to ones that charge non-excessive or reason-
able conditions. See Been, supra note 20, at 512.
Richard Epstein has questioned the effectiveness of exit as a constraint on majori-
tarian oppression of developer minorities. In particular, he emphasizes that developers
lack an effective exit option once they have invested substantial capital into a particular
site in a particular locale. At that point, they may be, in effect, stuck. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 184-85 (1993). However, when a locality takes
advantage of "stuck" developers, it presumably sends a negative signal to the develop-
ment market as a whole. That signal may persuade developers to forego making future
investments in the locality. For localities that do wish to maximize new development,
taking advantage of stuck developers is a poor long-term strategy.
Some localities, of course, may not want to maximize new development. A locality's
practice of insisting upon excessive development conditions may cost the locality some
new development opportunities. But in a majoritarian political milieu, that outcome may
be unproblematic or even affirmatively desirable. As discussed above, a local majority
may reap benefits from restrictions on the growth of the total supply of developed par-
cels. See Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities as a Constraint on Land
Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REV. 831,834-35 (1992) (arguing that municipalities often do
not compete for new residents).
Moreover, under certain market conditions, a locality may not lose much new devel-
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In any event, it is unclear that majoritarian dominance is the
only, or even principal, dynamic in local land use politics. In sharp
contrast to the majoritarian story about development politics, there is
a competing story about political corruption resulting in under-
regulation of new development. The under-regulation account has
comparable intuitive plausibility and possibly as much anecdotal sup-
port.'
In this account, a small minority of developers and their allies
capture the local political process by virtue of their monetary re-
sources and high degree of political organization. This story might be
called a "public choice" story because a basic insight of public choice
theory is that small groups with large individual member stakes in the
outcome of a dispute enjoy organizational advantages over large
groups-indeed, political majorities-with equal or larger aggregate
stakes, but much smaller individual member stakes.131 For one thing,
large groups are simply more costly to organize than small groups: It
is cheaper and easier to arrange communications and meetings
among a coalition of four or five prominent developers than among a
coalition of, for example, 30,000 homeowners.3  Moreover, where
opment as a result of imposing excessive development conditions: When developers per-
ceive the opportunities in a locality as unique or non-fungible (as for example, where the
locality is the established commercial center in a metropolitan area), developers may
tolerate excessive conditions rather than transfer their capital to another locality that
promises not to impose excessive conditions. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 184-86; Sterk, supra,
at 858-65.
130. In Ellickson's terminology, the counterpoint to the majoritarian model is the
"[d]eveloper influence" model of local politics. Ellickson, supra note 123, at 407-08. For
anecdotal accounts that suggest the considerable power developers exercise in local poli-
tics by legal and not-so-legal means, see Gregg Herrington, Commissioner Mel Gordon
Nutley He's Not, COLUMBIAN, Oct. 1, 1995, at Al; John King, Growth Opponents Speak
Up at the Polls, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 7, 1993, at A19; Susan Kuczka, Land Locks County into
Election Battle, CH. TRIB. (Lake ed.), Jan. 19, 1996, at 1; Carol Lewis, Annexation, Gas
Station Gets OK, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1995, at 8B; Jim Newton
& Rose Ellen O'Connor, Mission Viejo Co. Plays Politics with Vengeance, L.A. TIMES
(Orange County ed.), Aug. 19, 1990, at Al; Susan Schmidt, Developer Kenneth Michael:
A Mix of Politics and Business in Prince George's County, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,1989, at
Dl; Genelle Treaster, Supervisors Favor Wilton Housing Project, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Feb. 25, 1996, at N1; Victory for Public, Environment, L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.),
May 28, 1989, at Metro 10.
131. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275,286-87 (1988).
132. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACrION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 48 (rev. ed. 1971) ("[Tjhe larger the number of members
in the group the greater the organization costs, and thus the higher the hurdle that must
be jumped before any of the collective good at all can be obtained."). For analyses of the
disadvantages of small groups and individuals in the political process, see Daniel A. Far-
ber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 132-36
(1992); William A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient
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the members of a large group have relatively small individual stakes
in the outcome of the dispute, they may be particularly tempted to
"free ride"i-to rely on the other members of the large group to pro-
vide the money, time, and energy necessary to influence the outcome
of the dispute."'
In the development regulation context, developers often have
large individual stakes in ensuring that as much new development as
possible will be permitted. While landowning majorities may have
an interest in opposing new development or imposing excessive de-
velopment conditions on developers, that interest may not be large
on a per individual basis for any significant number of citizens. Ac-
cordingly, there may be no critical mass of citizens willing to make an
issue of development regulation in local elections or to appear at
public hearings regarding specific development projects. Nor may
diffuse political majorities have the cohesion to raise the money nec-
essary to influence local officials where legal or illegal campaign
contributions or gifts are an essential part of the political regime.
There are documented accounts of developers bribing local offi-
cials,'4 but apparently no such accounts exist of bribery by the
opponents of new development.
This analysis suggests that the more majoritarian a community's
politics are, the more we should be concerned about over-regulation
of development. To the extent that small locality politics tend to be
more majoritarian than large locality or state politics, over-regulation
is a greater concern in small localities.'3 Theoretical constructs aside,
however, there seems to be a slim empirical basis for concluding that
small locality politics are generally rife with majoritarian abuse of
power. 36 Moreover, even if small localities generally are subject to
Regulation a Taking of Property?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 865, 892-94 (1991); Saul
Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. REv. 1333, 1355 (1991).
133. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 23 (1991) (explaining that where "any single person's ef-
forts ... can have only an infinitesimal effect[,] ... a rational person will try to 'free ride'
on the efforts of others").
134. On bribery in development politics, see Donald G. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipe-
OUtS, in WINDFALLS FOR WIPEOUTS, supra note 127, at 20,22.
135. See FISCHEL, supra note 123, at 334 (concluding that "judicial discipline is more
necessary in the smaller than in the larger units" of government); Ellickson, supra note
123, at 409 ("The [developer] influence model best fits central cities, and the majoritarian
model, elite suburbs.").
136. See Vicki Been, The Perils of Paradoxes-Comment on William A. Fischel,
"Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Prop-
erty?" 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 913, 920 (1991) (stating that "there is enormous room for
debate about whether all or even most local governments fit [the majoritarian] model");
Deakin, supra note 33, at 106 (noting that "many elected officials, particularly in the sub-
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majoritarian domination, that does not mean that developers neces-
sarily lack effective recourse within the democratic political process.
Developers quite often have been successful in countering local
regulatory "abuses" by enlisting state legislatures to act on their be-
half. 37
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF NEXUS/ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY
REVIEW: SACRIFICING ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY TO ADVANCE A
NARROW CONCEPTION OF EXPENDITURE EFFICIENCY
Even if we assume that the risk of majoritarian oppression justi-
fies judicial policing of development conditions, the question remains
whether the Supreme Court's nexus/rough proportionality standard is
a suitable vehicle for such policing. This Part argues that
nexus/rough proportionality review may be undesirable because it
may lead courts to invalidate allocatively efficient development con-
ditions.
As discussed above, a development condition ensures allocative
efficiency in a land market if it imposes costs on the developer that
are equivalent to the net costs that the development project exter-
nalizes onto the community at large. For example, an impact fee is
allocatively efficient if it imposes a $100,000 cost on the developer of
a project that creates net social costs with a money equivalent of
$100,000. From the perspective of allocative efficiency, the important
consideration is the amount of the fee or fee equivalent imposed on
the development, not the manner in which the fee or fee equivalent is
spent."
A development condition, however, can be conceptualized as
urbs, are involved in real estate or associated professions" and need to "[m]aintain[] good
relations with the development community"); Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1131-32 (1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONoMIcs, AND POLITICS (1995)) (criticizing the majoritarian model
of local politics as an example of "localism bashing").
137. See ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBARIEZ, supra note 23, at 53 ("In general it is devel-
opers who have taken the lead in pursuing legislation-primarily to secure state
protection against new local practices that they find threatening."); Jane H. Lillydahl et
al., The Need for a Standard State Impact Fee Enabling Act, 54 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 7, 9,
12 (1988) (describing developers' success in securing state legislative protection against
local fee practices); Note, Municipal Development Exactions, the Rational Nexus Test, and
the Federal Constitution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 992, 1010 (1989) (explaining that "land de-
velopment interests that have little influence with particular localities still wield
formidable political power at the state level").
138. The imposition of the $100,000 development condition ensures that the developer
will proceed with the project only if her expected profits exceed the $100,000 social cost
of development. The $100,000 condition will achieve that efficiency-enhancing result
regardless of the use to which the locality puts any money it collects from the developer.
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something other than a means of forcing development to internalize
net social costs. Most notably for our purposes, development condi-
tions often are conceived as a source of financing for direct
government expenditures or government-mandated private expendi-
tures aimed at the correction or mitigation of some societal
problem."9 From this perspective, the effectiveness or efficiency of a
given development condition would be measured by the amount of
social cost reduction or social need satisfaction achieved per dollar or
dollar equivalent of expenditure. The greater the ratio of social cost
reduction to dollar of expenditure, the greater is what this Article will
call the "expenditure efficiency" of the development condition. This
expenditure efficiency inquiry is not concerned with whether the cost
imposed upon new development equals the externalized net social
cost of new development.
Both the nexus and rough proportionality tests are concerned
with expenditure efficiency, rather than allocative efficiency.1" The
nexus test asks whether the costs borne by a developer as a result of a
development condition will mitigate any of the specific social costs
caused by the development. The rough proportionality test asks
whether the amount of mitigation achieved by a development condi-
tion is sufficiently great to justify the developer's expenditure; that is,
is the return on the expenditure (measured by social cost reduction)
sufficiently large to pass a constitutional threshold for expenditure
efficiency? Neither test compares the magnitude of social costs cre-
ated by a development project with the magnitude of the developer's
costs in meeting development conditions.141
In most contexts, the allocative efficiency inquiry and the expen-
diture efficiency inquiry are temporally separated, so there are no
obvious tensions between the two inquiries. For example, consider
the case of a plant that spews fumes into the air. Assume that the
pollution caused by the plant has a social cost equivalent of $3000 per
day, and that a daily pollution tax is imposed on the plant. The tax
139. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBA.JEZ, supra note 23, at 7 (describing
"exactions [as] at once instruments for shaping the physical environment [and] for gener-
ating public revenue").
140. For a reading of Dolan that similarly interprets the rough proportionality test as
entailing a comparison between "the reduction in external costs of the development
flowing from the exaction and the opportunity costs of the proposed exaction," see Mer-
rill, supra note 5, at 885.
141. The Dolan Court, for example, did not compare or suggest that the City of Tigard
should have compared the social costs of the several hundred car trips that the hardware
store expansion would generate with the cost to Florence Dolan of the greenway and
bicycle path conditions. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395-96.
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money is paid into the general United States Treasury, which fi-
nances the operation of the government, including programs ranging
from public safety to Medicare.
In this context, the allocative efficiency inquiry would focus on
whether the pollution tax equaled the $3000 per day social cost of the
plant's pollution. The efficiency expenditure inquiry would have
nothing to do with the magnitude of that tax per se, but rather would
focus on the social gain achieved by the marginal increase in expendi-
ture of United States Treasury funds made possible by the collection
of the pollution tax. The relevant question would be, for example,
whether the United States' expenditure of an additional $3000 on a
community policing grant would generate the equivalent of a $3000
reduction in social costs from crime.
Because development conditions serve as both a means of forc-
ing development to internalize social costs and a means of financing
government or government-mandated expenditures for the reduction
or elimination of social costs, development conditions expose the po-
tential tension between efforts to achieve allocative efficiency and
efforts to achieve expenditure efficiency. A development condition
might meet the criteria for allocative efficiency but fail to meet the
criteria for expenditure efficiency embodied in the nexus/rough pro-
portionality tests. Nexus/rough proportionality review, therefore,
might lead courts to invalidate some allocatively efficient conditions.
As a result, such review might lessen allocative efficiency in land de-
velopment markets.
A. Traffic Congestion Hypothetical
In the following discussion, a simple hypothetical example illus-
trates the possible tensions between allocative efficiency and
expenditure efficiency in the development conditions context. The
hypothetical involves a proposed subdivision development. Three
scenarios are considered in turn: the scenario in which the subdivi-
sion development will generate no negative externalities, the scenario
in which the development will generate no net negative externalities,
and the scenario in which the development will generate net negative
externalities.
1. Development Generating No Negative Externalities
In the case of a subdivision development that generates no nega-
tive externalities, any development condition would be allocatively
inefficient. Local regulators would not be able to establish that a de-
velopment condition would reduce the social costs created by such a
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development because the development would create no costs. Ac-
cordingly, any development condition would fail the nexus test and
be invalidated. Thus, where a new development would generate no
negative externalities, nexus/rough proportionality review reaches
the same results as-and is a very good proxy for-direct allocative
efficiency review.
2. Development Generating No Net Negative Externalities
Now imagine that the subdivision development would generate
negative externalities, but those negative externalities would be out-
weighed by positive externalities. Again, any development condition
would be allocatively inefficient. Nexus/rough proportionality re-
view, however, would not necessarily result in the invalidation of a
development condition in this context. If the locality's development
condition would reduce the subdivision's anticipated negative exter-
nalities only at relatively high cost to the developer, a court might
strike down the condition as disproportionate on, in essence, expen-
diture efficiency grounds. But if the condition would reduce negative
externalities at relatively low cost to the developer, a court might well
uphold the condition as proportionate. Nothing in the Nollan or
Dolan majority opinions (or the subsequent state court case law) in-
dicates that a court may or should consider the anticipated positive
externalities of a development project in determining
"proportionality" under the nexus/rough proportionality standard.4 '
With respect to development that generates negative externalities,
but even greater positive externalities, nexus/rough proportionality
review thus has limited appeal. Such review would not result in the
invalidation of any allocatively efficient conditions. On the other
hand, it would not consistently result in the invalidation of alloca-
tively inefficient conditions.
3. Development Generating Net Negative Externalities
Where the subdivision development would generate net negative
externalities for the regulating community, nexus/rough proportion-
ality review might result in the invalidation of allocative efficiency
development conditions. Imagine, for example, that the proposed
new development borders an already-crowded road. The new devel-
142. But see Douglas T. Kendall & James E. Ryan, "Paying" for the Change: Using
Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan, 81 VA. L. REV.
1801, 1815 (1995) ("A reasonable argument could be made that courts, in applying this
test, can and should consider any offsetting benefits a community will receive from devel-
opment when determining its impact.").
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opment would generate even more traffic congestion, which in turn
will diminish the quality of life in the community. The social cost of
congestion, of course, has no readily ascertainable dollar value, but
(as discussed above) if the dollar costs borne by developers are to be
compared with the social costs of congestion, both costs clearly must
be reduced to a common metric. Let us assume, therefore, that one
additional car added to rush-hour traffic each day over the next five
years has a present value of negative $1000. Also assume that the
development project in question would add 100 cars to each rush
hour over the next five years, so that the congestion cost of the new
project to society is, in money terms, negative $100,000."3 Assume
also that the development would generate no positive externalities,
so that the anticipated net social cost of the development is $100,000.
Now imagine the municipality proposes, as a condition for
granting the subdivision developer the necessary permissions, that
the developer finance a commuter bus route from the subdivision to a
commuter rail station. Municipal officials believe that the new bus
line might entice some residents of the new subdivision not to com-
mute to work by car. The municipality's best estimate is that the new
bus would reduce the number of new cars on the road added by the
development from 100 per day to 60 per day over the next five years.
The cost of financing the new bus would be $60,000.
Under Dolan rough proportionality review, the commuter bus
condition might well be deemed unconstitutional even though it is
allocatively efficient. Figure One shows why this is so. Column II
represents the externalized social costs of congestion created by the
project. Column III represents the marginal reduction in external-
ized congestion costs between the unconditional development
scenario and the bus condition development scenario. Column IV
represents the regulatory costs imposed by the town on the devel-
oper. Column V represents the marginal increase in regulatory costs
for the developer between the unconditional development scenario
and the bus condition development scenario.
143. This arguably is a low estimate. Traffic congestion is perhaps the most important
issue in local political debates regarding growth. See Robert H. Freilich & S. Mark White,
Transportation Congestion and Growth Management: Comprehensive Approaches to Re-
solving America's Major Quality of Life Crisis, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 915, 917-18 (1991)
("In many rapidly growing areas, citizens perceive traffic congestion as the greatest public
problem, outdistancing crime, the economy and housing shortages .... Traffic congestion
now constitutes a predominant motivating factor behind recent growth control move-




I II III IV V
Development Externalized Marginal Developer's Marginal






Conditional 60,000 40,000 60,000 60,000
Development
An allocative efficiency inquiry focuses on the comparison be-
tween columns II and IV: When the figures in those two columns are
identical, the regulatory system is properly requiring full cost inter-
nalization by developers. In this hypothetical, the $60,000 bus
condition is equal to-and hence effects a full internalization of-the
$60,000 in externalized congestion costs the project will create when
it is built along with the establishment of a new commuter bus.
By contrast, the nexus/rough proportionality inquiry focuses on
the comparison between columns III and V: The greater the ratio of
marginal social cost reduction to marginal increase in developer cost,
the more likely a court would be to deem a condition roughly propor-
tionate. Here, only a $40,000 marginal reduction in congestion costs
results from a $60,000 marginal increase in developer expenditure. A
court following Nollan and Dolan could rule that a $40,000/$60,000 or
2/3 mitigation ratio is too low to pass muster under the nexus/rough
proportionality criteria for expenditure efficiency.
According to proponents of unconstitutional conditions scrutiny
in land use, judicial invalidation of conditions such as the $60,000 bus
condition will prompt governments to select less burdensome condi-
tions or simply allow unconditional development.1" If the
government in this hypothetical responds to the striking down of the
$60,000 condition by selecting unconditional development, allocative
efficiency clearly is not served; under that scenario, the developer will
not be required to internalize any of the $100,000 in congestion costs
that the subdivision project would create.
The locality, of course, could opt for a condition that will cost
the developer less than the $60,000 bus condition. For example, the
144. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 63 (concluding that heightened judicial review
of development conditions will lead governments to ease regulatory burdens on develop-
ment).
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locality could devise a plan where the developer would be required to
expend only $40,000. However, if the ratio of social cost reduction to
developer expenditure continues to be 2/3, then the $40,000 devel-
oper investment will reduce congestion costs by only $27,000 (from
$100,000 to $73,000), and the developer will fail to internalize $33,000
in congestion costs attributable to its development. Moreover, even
the $40,000 condition could be struck down under rough proportion-
ality review because the ratio of social cost reduction to developer
expenditure still would be low.
If the locality could devise a way to raise that ratio to 1/1, a
$40,000 condition presumably would be upheld, but in that case,
there still would be $60,000 in congestion costs produced by the de-
velopment and $20,000 under-internalization of congestion costs by
the developer. The only way that the locality surely could pass mus-
ter under nexus/rough proportionality review and ensure allocative
efficiency with a $40,000 condition is if it devised a remarkably effec-
tive new mitigation plan-a plan so effective that the $40,000
expenditure would reduce congestion costs by $60,000 (from $100,000
to $40,000). In that case, there would be a 3/2 ratio ($60,000/$40,000)
of marginal social cost reduction to marginal increase in developer's
regulatory cost, and an equivalence between the externalized social
costs of the project ($40,000) and the developer's regulatory cost
($40,000).
Figure Two illustrates the relevant variables with a $40,000 bus
condition under varying assumptions of expenditure efficiency:
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Figure Two
I II III IV V VI
Development Expenditure Externalized Marginal Developer's Marginal
Scenario Efficiency Social Costs Decrease in Regulatory Increase in
Ratio Externalized Costs Developer's
Social Costs Regulatory
Costs
Unconditional - 100,000 -- -0- --
Development
Conditional 213 73,000 27,000 40,000 40,000
Development
Unconditional -- 100,000 -- -0- --
Development
Conditional 1/1 60,000 40,000 40,000 40,000
Development
Unconditional -- 100,000 -- -0- --
Development
Conditional 3/2 40,000 60,000 40,000 40,000
Development I I I
B. The Slothful Regulators Objection
One potential objection to the preceding analysis is that judicial
rejection of the original $60,000 bus line condition makes some sense
because it provides the locality with an incentive to devise a devel-
opment condition that yields more benefits than costs.145 According
to this objection, regulators could make development pay for its ex-
ternalized social costs and utilize those payments in a manner that
maximizes societal return if only they invested the effort.'46
145. A number of commentators argue that, in the absence of a constitutional bar
against uncompensated government regulation, politicians sometimes will succumb to the
"fiscal illusion" that regulatory interventions in the private marketplace are costless.
Accordingly, they sometimes will institute regulatory measures whose actual costs exceed
their benefits-measures that are, in this Article's terminology, "expenditure inefficient."
See, e.g., Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 108, at 621 ("Fiscal illusion arises because the
costs of governmental actions are generally discounted by the decisionmaking body unless
they explicitly appear as a budgetary expense. Compensation removes fiscal illusion
... *"); Merrill, supra note 5, at 883 ("Without the compensation requirement, the gov-
ernment would acquire inefficiently large stockpiles of... resources that could be put to
better use in other applications.").
146. Another possible objection is that localities need not use development conditions
at all in order to achieve full social cost internalization. Most notably, user fees can
achieve the same purpose as development conditions without the same constitutional
obstacles and arguably with greater efficiency. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAiRJEZ, su-
pra note 23, at 137 (stating that "virtually all economists agree ... that governments
should rely more heavily on use efficient charges"). For example, in response to the traf-
fic congestion engendered by new development, a locality could require commuters on
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However, the nexus/rough proportionality criteria might leave
even the best-intentioned, most hard-working, and sensible local
government officials unable to utilize development conditions that
would achieve the goal of full cost internalization by new develop-
ment. First, it is important to grasp the narrowness of the
nexus/rough proportionality test's conception of expenditure effi-
ciency. Imagine, for example, that in the case of the $60,000 bus line,
the bus line also would attract some long-time residents who previ-
ously drove to work and thus contributed to congestion.
Consequently, the bus line would reduce $40,000 worth of congestion
attributable to the new development and $40,000 of congestion that
existed prior to-and thus is not attributable to-the new develop-
ment. Under these assumptions, the bus line would seem to be a
highly cost-effective expenditure; the return on a $60,000 expenditure
would be a total of $80,000 in social cost reduction.
Under nexus/rough proportionality review, however, the bus
condition still would be unacceptable; indeed, it would be unaccept-
able even if the bus line would reduce $100,000 in congestion that
existed prior to, and hence was not attributable to, the new subdivi-
sion. According to the clear reasoning of Nollan and Dolan, the only
social costs that can figure in nexus/rough proportionality evaluations
are costs the new development project itself would create.47
Second, some development projects may create real external so-
cial costs that simply cannot be mitigated by development conditions,
at least not in the specific, direct way demanded by the nexus/rough
proportionality tests. Consider, for example, a development project
crowded roads to pay tolls that force them to internalize the social costs of their daily
commuting. However, as a practical matter, tolls may be technically or economically
infeasible on smaller roads. See id. at 117-20 (describing the practical challenges to user
fees). They also may be politically impossible. See id. at 137 ("Politicians are highly skit-
tish about [user charges] ... because they doubt their ability to persuade ordinary voters
and media commentators that such charges are equitable.").
In theory, localities also could use their taxing power to force new development to in-
ternalize its net social costs. For example, a locality could establish a higher property tax
rate for any new development that is expected to generate unusually great social costs;
such taxes might pass federal constitutional muster under rational basis review. See
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1992) (applying the rational basis standard to an
equal protection challenge to California's acquisition price formula for assessing property
taxes). State constitutional and statutory law, however, severely limit localities' flexibility
in imposing property taxes. See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 511-93 (1994) (exploring state law limitations on local taxation).
147. See, e.g., Jan G. Laitos, Causation and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was a Taking, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 893, 893 (1995)
(explaining that a central inquiry in Dolan "involves causation: does the exaction relate to
the harm 'caused' by the new development?").
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that involves the building of a structure which is much taller than
other structures in a commercial area; the structure would make the
street less sunny and airy than it currently is, and would compromise
some of the aesthetic appeal of the commercial area. Under accepted
zoning and constitutional law, a community almost certainly could
prohibit the structure based on scale or even direct aesthetic
grounds.1" If the locality allows the building to be constructed, it will
incur some social costs as a result of the scale of the building. Yet no
development conditions may exist that can mitigate scale effects: If
sunlight is blocked, it is blocked, period.149 Under a regime without
unconstitutional conditions review, the locality could allow the
building but place conditions on the development permission that
compensate the locality for the social cost of lost sunlight and aes-
thetic appeal, thereby satisfying the goal of full social cost
internalization by new development. Under the Nollan nexus test,
however, the locality cannot impose any conditions on its develop-
ment permission because there simply are no conditions that mitigate
the specific social costs of the project.
The Nollan case itself arguably involved such an impossible-to-
mitigate social cost. As discussed above, the California Coastal
Commission was concerned that construction of large beachfront
houses (such as the one the Nollans built) would create a physical
environment that suggested to potential beach visitors that the beach
was essentially off-limits or private."o The Nollan Court suggested
that the Coastal Commission could have placed conditions on the
permit that actually would mitigate the "psychological barrier" cost
entailed in having a string of large houses along a beachfront.15' Yet
it is not at all clear that such a psychological barrier cost could be
mitigated. If people driving by a beach see a series of large homes
with hardly any area of beach visible, they are likely to move on to
find another area that seems more genuinely open to the public, even
148. See generally Samuel Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority of
Jurisdictions Authorize Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125, 127 (1980) (surveying
judicial attitudes toward aesthetic zoning).
149. Similarly, it may be impossible to mitigate the adverse impacts of increased noise
from new development. See, e.g., Steven N. Brautigam, Rethinking the Regulation of Car
Horn and Car Alarm Noise: An Incentive-Based Proposal to Help Restore Civility to Cit-
ies, 19 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 391, 400 (1994) (discussing severe effects of noise pollution
and difficulties of mitigating those effects); Tom Neuhoff, Jr., Obstacles to Increasing
Airspace: Jumping Through Environmental Law Hoops, 58 J. AIR L. & COM. 221, 252
(1992) (noting limits in our capacity to mitigate noise).
150. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838 (1987) (noting that
the Commission regarded the house as a "psychological barrier" to access).
151. Id.
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if there are "viewing spots" tucked between the houses.' Under a
nexus/rough proportionality regime, the Coastal Commission does
not really have the option of imposing development conditions that
will achieve social cost internalization, because no conditions exist
that would reduce the particular social costs created by new building.
Third, even when mitigation is possible, it may be unavoidably
expensive and thus might be rejected by a court as disproportionately
burdensome under Dolan's rough proportionality test. Sometimes
the only means of mitigation available to a locality imposes very large
financial burdens on the developer for seemingly small, and perhaps
uncertain, mitigation results. For example, imagine that a community
waives a wetlands preservation requirement to allow the filling of
wetlands because the filling is necessary for the completion of a
shopping mall project. The wetlands serve certain ecological and
health functions,153 and their destruction might well be regarded as a
real social cost. The community could require the developer to miti-
gate the wetlands loss by creating wetlands elsewhere, but such
mitigation efforts are extremely expensive and are unlikely to recre-
ate the ecological and otherfunctions'served by natural wetlands.114
The same limited mitigation options may confront a community
dealing with traffic congestion. A commuter bus line may cost a
great deal and reduce congestion only modestly, but it may be the
best option available. Ecological, technological, and legal constraints
often make the mitigation of traffic congestion extremely problem-
152. Id. at 836 (suggesting that the Court would have upheld a condition that
"consisted of the requirement that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property
for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere").
153. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 965-66 (1992) (outlining the values of wetlands).
154. See, e.g., David Farrier, Conserving Biodiversity on Private Land: Incentives for
Management or Compensation for Lost Expectations?, 19 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 303,369
(1995) ("[Wetlands restoration and creation as compensation for further destruction of
wetland values is riddled with problems."); Mark C. Rouvalis, Restoration of Wetlands
Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: An Analytical Synthesis of Statutory and Case
Law Principles, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 295, 319 (1988) ("The restoration process
may take twenty to thirty years before the damaged wetland will closely approximate its
formerly undisturbed state. Even such a lengthy period does not ensure that the wet-
lands' former plant and animal life will recover fully .... " (footnote omitted)); Energy
and Natural Resources-Wetlands: Restoration Difficult, Maine Officials Find,
GREENWIRE, Nov. 30, 1993, available in WL at 11/30/93 APN-GR 12 (discussing "how
hard it can be to replace natural wetlands that are sacrificed to development"); Past Time
to Curtail the Loss of Wetlands: Mitigation Projects Are No Substitute for the Real Thing,
L.A. TIMES (Orange County ed.), Aug. 9, 1992, at B10; William K. Stevens, Restoring
Lost Wetland: It's Possible But Not Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1991, at C1 (noting that
"according to proliferating studies... [restoration] efforts are ending in failure").
[Vol. 751284
LAND USE REGULATION
atic.!5" Indeed, in Dolan, although the City of Tigard's use of bicycle
and pedestrian paths as a means of mitigating traffic congestion
might have been somewhat burdensome to developers and only
modestly effective at reducing congestion from new development,156 it
nonetheless might have been the city's best mitigation alternative.
The city already had a public transportation system, and road-
widening might have been very expensive and attracted even more
cars, thus causing more pollution problems. 8
The preceding analysis suggests that nexus/rough proportionality
review may yield a lower net level of social welfare than the absence
of any review of development conditions. As discussed above,
nexus/rough proportionality may produce social welfare losses in the
form of lesser allocative efficiency. Such review may even discourage
conditions that are highly expenditure efficient, as illustrated by the
example of the commuter bus that would eliminate congestion both
attributable and not attributable to new development.
At a minimum, nexus/rough proportionality review should not
apply when, as was arguably the case in both Nollan and Dolan;
regulators can make a plausible claim that new development wil
(1) produce real social costs that equal or exceed the developer's
155. See, e.g., Marilyn Newman, The "New" Curb-Cut Permits: Highway Access and
Environmental Regulation, BOSTON B.J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 25, 27 (noting the "adverse
environmental or other impacts" that may result from traffic mitigation efforts); G. Ken-
neth Orski, Transportation Management Associations: Bottling Suburban Traffic
Congestion, URB. LAND, Dec. 1986, at 2, 3 (noting that "unacceptable levels of disrup-
tion" may result from road widening or the construction of new roads and explaining that
even "well-conceived and aggressively promoted" traffic control programs may reduce
congestion by only "10 to 15 percent").
156. But see David Ackerly, Note and Comment, Exactions for Transportation Corri-
dors After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 247, 293 (1995) (arguing that
bicycle paths are reasonably effective in curbing congestion).
157. See, e.g., Robert Cervero, Unlocking Suburban Gridlock, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N
389,400 (1986). Cervero explained:
[p]erhaps the most serious flaw in all supply-side responses to traffic congestion
is that they all too often exacerbate the very problem they attempt to solve. The
literature is replete with examples of expanded roadways generating new traffic,
which in turn necessitates further expansion, which induces more traffic, and so
on and so on.
Id. (citation and footnote omitted); see also Shirley S. Gregory, Driving Time May Double
in a Decade, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1996, Metro Du Page, at 3 ("[R]oad-building is not al-
ways the answer to growing traffic demands... because better roads tend to attract more
traffic .... 'That's always the problem-you build something and everybody comes.' "). ,
158. See F. Kaid Benfield, Running on Empty: The Case for a Sustainable National
Transportation System, 25 ENVTL. L. 651, 654-57 (1995) (discussing links between traffic
congestion and air pollution); Ackerly, supra note 156, at 293 (noting that "[b]icycles are
the most energy-efficient form of transportation, as well as one of the least polluting").
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costs of fulfilling the requested development conditions; and (2) the
specific and direct sort of mitigation required by nexus/rough propor-
tionality review is either impossible to achieve or impossible to
achieve in a cost-effective manner. In such cases, constitutional in-
validation of the locality's development conditions on nexus/rough
proportionality grounds does nothing to encourage greater expendi-
ture efficiency. At the same time, that invalidation may reduce
allocative efficiency by allowing developers to escape responsibility
for the externalized social costs of their projects.' 9
IV. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND THE CIRCUMVENTION OF
NEXUS/ROUGH PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Many commentators have suggested that nexus/rough propor-
tionality review has had-or will have-a dramatic effect on the
ability of localities to employ development conditions.'w According
to this view, "[t]he obstacles that Nollan and Dolan place before mu-
nicipalities are undeniably significant .... Not only will the general
prospect of litigation render municipalities more cautious in ap-
proaching exactions, the burden-of-proof allocation also will make it
easier for landowners to reduce the exaction sought by threatening to
sue..... The ramifications of Dolan, it is argued, are incalculable:
"[E]very dissatisfied property owner becomes a potential plaintiff.' 62
There will be, in short, "a chilling effect" on land use planning.'
63
159. Application of this test for development conditions might well require courts to
make difficult assessments of, and comparisons among, social costs and benefits. See su-
pra notes 113-22 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of assessing and
comparing social costs and benefits). However, this test would not require courts to make
any more difficult assessments and comparisons than are required by Dolan's rough pro-
portionality test.
160. See, e.g., Been, supra note 20, at 545 (suggesting that Nollan's nexus requirement
will chill creative land use regulation); Paul D. Kamenar, Review of the Supreme Court's
1993-1994 Term: Property Owners Get a Tool, LEGAL TIMES, July 25, 1994, at S42
(arguing that Dolan "will... have a profound effect on those exaction cases currently in
litigation").
161. Kendall & Ryan, supra note 142, at 1813-15.
162. Kossow, supra note 76, at 239.
163. Kendall & Ryan, supra note 142, at 1815. Kendall and Ryan argue that localities
could use their eminent domain power to circumvent nexus/rough proportionality review.
See id at 1803 ("[Wjhere the value of a development permit exceeds the value of the land
exaction sought by the town, the town should take the land through eminent domain and
give the landowner a choice between cash compensation and compensation in the form of
a development permit."). Their proposal would allow localities to continue the same
practices as before but under a different label (eminent domain, rather than police
power). For just this reason, it is unclear whether the courts would uphold the constitu-
tionality of their proposal. See id. at 1876 (acknowledging that "[lt is possible that a
court, or the Supreme Court if it came to it, would deem our proposal no more 'than an
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There are, however, reports that Dolan has had little effect on
the frequency or magnitude of the conditions demanded and ob-
tained by local regulators.'" It is difficult to know how much weight
to accord these essentially anecdotal reports. Moreover, even if
Nollan and Dolan have had little effect to date, that may simply re-
flect their relative newness. Under prevailing federal ripeness
doctrine, it is extremely difficult for a landowner to challenge devel-
opment conditions in federal district court; as a result, state courts
occupy the predominant role in giving meaning to federal constitu-
tional rules regarding land use.1' Many state courts are still
"sympathetic" toward land use regulators, and the United States Su-
preme Court has limited resources with which to police state court
misapplications or non-applications of the nexus/rough proportional-
ity tests.'" Accordingly, some state courts may inject more deference
into the nexus/rough proportionality inquiry than would a majority of
Supreme Court Justices.67 Until it is clear that this will not be the
case, rational regulators may continue to operate as if their range of
exercise in cleverness and imagination'" (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825,841 (1987))).
164. See, e.g., FIsCHEL, supra note 123, at 346 (reporting on Nollan's lack of impact on
regulators' demands); Timothy V. Ramis et al., Dolan v. City of Tigard: First Reaction, in
INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT LIABILITY, at 233, 246 (ALI-
ABA Course of Study, May 4, 1995), available in WL at C997 ALI-ABA 233 (concluding
that interviews of local planners "show that the Dolan decision is having, at most, modest
effects"); Deena Higgs, Developers Eagerly Await Key State Court Decisions, L.A. Bus.
J., July 25, 1994, § 2, at 14 (reporting the opinion of a local planner that Dolan has not had
"a big impact" in California).
165. See Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of
Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go To Avoid Adjudicating Land Use
Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91, 92 (1994) ("In effect, the ripeness doctrine ex-
cludes land use cases from federal court and requires a property owner to litigate a taking
case in state court."); Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal
Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17-32 (1995) (discussing federal ripeness requirements for
takings challenges to state or local land use regulation).
166. For an interesting model of how resource constraints affect Supreme Court deci-
sions, see McNollgast, Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995).
167. See John J. Delaney, Development Agreements: The Road from Prohibition to
"Let's Make A Deal!", in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES, AND DEDICATIONS, supra note 34,
at 384, 386 (arguing that "not all state courts" are applying the nexus test dictated by
Nollan); William Funk, Reading Dolan v. City of Tigard, 25 ENVTL. L. 127, 140 (1995)
("Given the practical inability of the Supreme Court to ride herd over the various states
in their individual applications of the rough proportionality test, state court proclivities
rather than the policies of the U.S. Supreme Court are likely to predominate."); Ronald
H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings
Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 523, 555 (1995) ("There has certainly been no rush to conservative economic consti-
tutionalism... as an outgrowth of the Nollan, Lucas, and Dolan decisions.").
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lawful authority had not been constricted.
This Part provides a theoretical basis for challenging the predic-
tions that nexus/rough proportionality review will lead regulators to
reduce significantly their development conditions demands. The
analysis conceptualizes the development regulation process as in-
volving two distinct types of transactions or games-one-time games
and repeat games.18 In the one-time game context, the prospect of
nexus/rough proportionality review sometimes may lead regulators to
impose less severe development conditions, or even allow uncondi-
tional development in some cases. In that context, however, the
prospect of nexus/rough proportionality review sometimes may lead
localities to deny development permission altogether, in which case
developers actually would be worse off and the resulting inefficien-
cies in development markets might be even greater.
169
In the repeat-game context, the prospect of nexus/rough propor-
tionality review may make little difference, because developers will
not risk their goodwill with regulators by suing to challenge devel-
opment conditions that they previously had purported to accept.7 ° In
the substantial portion of the new development market that already
is dominated by ongoing regulator-developer relationships, this
analysis suggests that the nexus/rough proportionality review may
have a notably modest impact. Moreover, because the prospect of
nexus/rough proportionality review decreases the attractiveness for
regulators of "making deals" with new or unknown developers,
nexus/rough proportionality review may intensify cronyism and in-
sularity in development markets and increase the attendant
inefficiencies.
A. Development Conditions in a One-Time Game
As discussed below, many developers specialize in particular lo-
calities. In some settings, however, a developer and regulator will
interact regarding possible development conditions in a context in
which both parties assume they will have no substantial relationship
168. For an excellent introduction to game theory and its applications to legal issues,
see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994).
169. For an analysis also exploring the possibility that judicial scrutiny of development
conditions will result in more frequent development prohibitions, see FISCHEL, supra note
123, at 346-47.
170. On the importance of reputation in repeat game settings, see ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPuTEs 220-29, 232-
33 (1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Rela-
tions in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 138-43 (1992); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 375,412-26 (1990).
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once the development is completed and no particular reason to care
about the long-term impression they make on each other.
At first blush, it would seem that the introduction of nexus/rough
proportionality review would have no effect on the pre-construction
dynamic between developers and regulators in such one-time transac-
tions. Before a developer receives permission to develop and
actually constructs a project, the constitutional standard for devel-
opment conditions is irrelevant because the developer cannot
credibly threaten to sue to challenge the development conditions that
the locality seeks to impose. For one thing, litigation takes time, and
for most developers, delay is extremely expensive and possibly ruin-
ous. More fundamentally, the threat to sue is not credible because
a locality could respond to the threat simply by denying development
permission altogether."
Nexus/rough proportionality review becomes significant once
construction of a new development has been completed. At that
point, the locality's leverage over the developer is severely limited or
171. See, e.g., Michael H. Crew, Development Agreements After Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), 22 URB. LAw. 23, 52 (1990) (noting that devel-
opers "'willingly'" pay exactions they deem excessive in order to avoid "the expense of
litigation and the accompanying project delays"); Keith Kraus, Dolan v. City of Tigard:
Property Owners Win the Battle But May Still Lose the War, 48 WASH. U.J. URB. &
CONTEMp. L. 275, 296 (1995) ("Because of the delays, costs, and risks of judicial appeal,
developers may have little choice but to succumb to local governments' demands.");
Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The Developer's Per-
spective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 518 (1988) ("The fact that developers are willing to pay
suggests the power of the local government's position, not the reasonableness of the exac-
tion."); Brian C. Levey, Limiting Conditions on Land Use Permits and the Supreme
Court's Decision in Dolan v. Tigard, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 5, 1994, at S2 (noting that
Dolan may have limited impact because developers remain "averse to... lawsuits").
172. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Village of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(describing a village government that revoked development permission after the land-
owner objected to a road dedication requirement in a building permit), appeal denied, 667
N.E.2d 1055 (IIl.), and cerL denied, 117 S. Ct. 413 (1996).
In his majority opinion in Nollan, Justice Scalia suggested that judicial scrutiny of de-
velopment conditions will lead to less restrictive, but better enforced, land use
regulations:
One would expect that a regime in which ... leveraging of the police power is
allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives
to accomplish other purposes, leading to lesser realization of the land-use goals
purportedly sought to be served than would result from more lenient (but non-
tradeable) development restrictions.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 n.5. A rational locality, however, might well respond to the ad-
vent of nexus/rough proportionality review by making its formal zoning law and
procedures even more restrictive. A restrictive zoning code bolsters the credibility of a
locality's implicit or explicit threats to developers that, if the developers refuse to comply
with development conditions, the locality will deny development permission altogether.
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non-existent, again assuming that the developer does not need the
regulators' goodwill to successfully pursue future projects. The de-
veloper at this point can threaten to sue for restitution of any money
spent or property ceded in satisfaction of the development condi-
tions. Such post-construction restitution suits are permissible
provided that the development conditions at issue were unconstitu-
tional; the developer's pre-construction assent to unconstitutional
conditions does not constitute a waiver of the right to challenge them
at a later date.17
Assuming that regulators are rational, they will understand that
nexus/rough proportionality review means that any pre-construction
development condition "deals" may be undone in post-construction
restitution litigation. Regulators' response to the risk of restitution
litigation will depend on whether they prefer development without
the conditions that the nexus/rough proportionality tests render un-
constitutional or, alternatively, no development at all. When
regulators prefer unconditional development to no development at
all, the perceived risk of restitution litigation may lead regulators to
allow unconditional development. This may be true even if develop-
ers at the pre-construction stage continue to express a willingness to
accept some conditions. Because regulators would only have to make
restitution after the development was completed, and the process of
imposing conditions and then being sued for restitution would con-
sume at least some administrative resources, the regulators might
conclude that they are better off not even asking for or accepting any
development conditions. By contrast, if the regulators prefer no new
development to unconditional development, the introduction of
nexus/rough proportionality review might lead them to deny devel-
opment permission. They may even refuse developers' offers to
discuss conditions because, again, they would have no means of as-
suring themselves that any agreement on development conditions
would be honored after construction was completed.
173. There are at least two reported post-Dolan cases in which a court has acknowl-
edged a developer's right to challenge a development condition to which the developer
had assented before construction of the project in question. See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King
County, 877 P.2d 187, 190-91 (Wash. 1994); Sarasota County v. Taylor Woodrow Homes
Ltd., 652 So. 2d 1247, 1251-52 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); see also John J. Delaney, Negoti-
ating Exactions Through Development Agreements: Current Issues, in PLANNING,
REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND COMPENSATION, at 153, 162-63
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 31, 1991), available in WL at C629 ALI-ABA 153
(reviewing the relevant case law and concluding that "court[s] refuse[] to require per-
formance by the developer... where enforcement of the development agreement would
result in a taking of private property").
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Whether regulators will prefer no development or unconditional
development, in turn, depends substantially on two factors:
(1) whether or not they are responsive to majoritarian pressures to
exploit developer minorities; and (2) their assessment of whether the
proposed development, in the absence of any "disproportionate" and
hence unconstitutional conditions, would generate net positive or net
negative externalities for the community. The following hypothetical
illustrates the relevance of these factors.
Consider a proposed townhouse development that local regula-
tors believe would generate $200,000 in negative externalities for the
community at large. Local regulators suspect that the developer's
gain from the project will be $ 1,000,000, but recognize the possibility
that the gain actually may be as little as $50,000. From an allocative
efficiency perspective, the regulators should approve the project be-
cause its anticipated net social value, including the developer's gain
and the community's loss, is $800,000. In order to ensure allocative
efficiency, however, the regulators also should require a $200,000
payment to the community as compensation for the negative exter-
nalities. The $200,000 compensation requirement ensures that the
project will proceed only if its expected social benefits exceed its ex-
pected social costs. If there is no compensation requirement and the
developer knows her gain actually will be only $50,000, the developer
will proceed with the project even though the project will result in a
$150,000 net decrease in social welfare. If the locality imposes a
$200,000 compensation requirement, the developer will proceed with
the project only if the developer anticipates a gain in excess of
$200,000.
Imagine that the local government in question is neither domi-
nated by a greedy majority nor captured by development interests.
Instead, it is a well-intentioned government that seeks to make so-
cially-optimal decisions. Prior to the adoption of a nexus/rough
proportionality regime, such a government would allow development
to proceed subject to a $200,000 development condition. As dis-
cussed in Part III, however, nexus/rough proportionality review
might allow the developer to recover a $200,000 development fee in a
post-construction restitution suit even though the project created
$200,000 in negative externalities. If that occurred, the community
would be worse off than before. To avoid that unwelcome result,
even a well-intentioned local government might choose to "play it
safe" and simply deny development permission altogether.
Now imagine that the local government is dominated by a
greedy majority intent upon exploiting developers. Prior to the adop-
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tion of nexus/rough proportionality review, such a government might,
for example, demand and receive a $400,000 development fee even
though the project would create only $200,000 in negative externali-
ties. Like the well-intentioned government, the greedy government
presumably would shift to a flat development prohibition if it be-
lieved that the full $400,000 might be recovered by the developer in a
post-construction restitution suit.
The same shift might occur even if the greedy government be-
lieved that nexus/rough proportionality review would allow it to
charge and retain up to $200,000 as compensation for the project's
negative externalities. If the locality were able to charge and retain
$200,000, the community would be no worse off after development
than before. Accordingly, one might think that the local government
would be indifferent as to whether no development occurred or de-
velopment occurred subject to a $200,000 condition. Recall,
however, that development prohibitions often confer some benefit on
local majorities by restricting the overall supply of developed units in
the market. The financial benefits to the local majority of restricting
supply might be sufficient to tip the greedy majoritarian government
in favor of a flat development prohibition. Consequently, rather than
an efficient project proceeding, albeit subject to an excessive
$400,000 condition, the project might not happen at all.
Allocatively inefficient shifts to development prohibitions are
much less likely where a development project is perceived as gener-
ating net positive externalities for the community at large. Imagine,
for example, that the townhouse development would generate no
negative externalities and $200,000 in positive externalities for the
community. In that case, the well-intentioned government presuma-
bly would demand no development conditions. Prior to the adoption
of nexus/rough proportionality review, the greedy majoritarian gov-
ernment still might demand and receive $400,000 in return for its
grant of development permission. Under a nexus/rough proportion-
ality regime, the greedy government would understand that the
developer could collect the full $400,000 fee in a post-construction
suit, so any pre-construction imposition of conditions would be futile.
The government probably would respond by allowing unconditional
development because even without any conditions the dominant po-
litical majority would be $200,000 better off after development than
before. The dominant majority, of course, might receive some prop-
erty value benefits from preventing an increase in the overall supply
of developed units. However, unless those property value benefits
exceeded $200,000, a development prohibition would make no
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sense.
174
Not surprisingly, development conditions are used most fre-
quently and most aggressively in communities whose electorate is
significantly concerned about the effects of growth-that is, where, in
my previous terminology, development is generally perceived as cre-
ating net negative externalities rather than net positive
externalities.' Developers who operate in such anti-growth or
growth-leery milieus generally oppose legal reforms that would radi-
cally curtail or abolish the use of development conditions.176 Their
stance reflects their understanding, as informed by their experience
in local politics, that development conditions render a significant
174. Indeed, more net positive externality projects may be completed under a
nexus/rough proportionality regime than under a regime in which there are no constitu-
tional limitations on development conditions. In a regime without nexus/rough
proportionality review, regulators might be tempted to push a developer just short of the
point where the developer would decide that the demanded development conditions
would render the project unprofitable. One might call this point the developer's "walk-
away point." The developer might well lie to the regulators about her walk-away point in
an effort to limit the development conditions she must pay. The regulators presumably
would know that the developer might lie, so that regulators and the developer might
reach an impasse where the developer announces she simply cannot proceed with the
project with the demanded development conditions and disbelieving regulators decide to
hold firm and wait for the developer to concede. The developer, however, may not back
down, either because the developer believes she can win a test of wills with the regulators
or because, in fact, the demanded conditions really do meet or exceed the developer's
walk-away point. Impasses of this sort might result in the abandonment of projects that
would have provided net benefits for both developers and regulating localities. A devel-
oper's walk-away point becomes irrelevant under a nexus/rough proportionality regime
because, as previously explained, local regulators would have little or no incentive to bar-
gain hard for the maximum amount of development conditions. The absence of
protection for localities against post-construction suits means that regulators will not bar-
gain for a maximum share of the developer's anticipated surplus or profits, which in turn
means that fewer projects will falter as a result of bargaining breakdown.
175. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & G6MEZ-IBA&EZ, supra note 23, at 58 (noting that
"[c]ommunities in the vanguard of exaction utilization tend to be among those least con-
cerned about attracting investment"); Robert A. Peters, The Politics of Enacting State
Legislation to Enable Local Impact Fees: The Pennsylvania Story, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N
61, 67 (1994) (reporting that the communities least concerned with discouraging growth
support the most aggressive development conditions policies).
176. See, e.g., SNYDER & STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 34 (finding support for devel-
opment fees is "almost universal among developers ... interviewed in California,
Colorado, and Florida," with the "strongest support... in areas where there were build-
ing moratoria or strong sentiments against development and higher taxes"); Deakin,
supra note 33, at 101-07 (noting that even developers often embrace development condi-
tions as a means of fending off anti-growth sentiment); Porter, supra note 92, at 76
(explaining that where "developers have experienced active citizen resistance to growth
or have seen the adoption of [building] moratoria due to inadequate facilities of one kind
or another, they are likely to embrace development fees as a workable alternative to
stopping all development").
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fraction of their development projects politically viable.
B. Development Conditions in a Repeat Game
The scenario depicted above-one in which the land use regula-
tors and the developer ex ante know that they will be engaged in a
single transaction or game-is not the predominant scenario in land
development. Especially in the context of residential development
and small-scale commercial development, local specialization appears
to be the norm. The "typical" developer in these categories focuses
on a few communities or counties and rarely crosses state bounda-
ries." The often cumbersome nature of local land use regulation, as
well as the idiosyncratic nature of local land markets, makes it ra-
tional for many developers to invest in local knowledge and local
"connections," and to seek a return on that investment by means of
local specialization.Y8 A "reputation as a responsible developer is
important" for any developer who "plans to work in ... [an] area for
several years." '79
177. This characterization of the real estate development industry is based in part on
telephone interviews conducted in the spring of 1995 with real estate development ex-
perts, including Gopal Ahluwalia, Research Economist, National Association of Home
Builders; Thomas Black, Research Director, Urban Land Institute; Professor Bernard
Frieden, Center for Real Estate at the University of California at Berkeley; and Professor
Lynne Sagalyn, Columbia Business School (notes on file with the author). The level of
regional and local concentration in the real estate development industry, especially the
residential development industry, is suggested by the geographical preferences developers
indicate in the NATIONAL REGISTER PUBLISHING COMPANY, THE REAL ESTATE
DIRECTORY OF MAJOR INVESTORS, DEVELOPERS AND BROKERS passim (1992), and by
Census statistics showing that development and building firms overwhelmingly operate
out of a single office or place of business, see UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1992 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: LEGAL FORM OF ORGANIZATION AND
TYPE OF OPERATION 2-4,8-10 (1995).
178. See MILES ET AL., supra note 32, at 208, 232 (explaining that "real estate devel-
opment is a shared process in which the private and public sectors continually
interact .... Thus, developers should acquire a keen knowledge of local regulations af-
fecting development .... [D]evelopers will find it good business practice to know local
public officials and administrators and to participate in community decision mak-
ing .... "); JIM POWELL, RISK, RUIN, & RICHES 245 (1986) (concluding that "real estate
remains a business fought on local issues .... A respected local developer... can do very
well against a much bigger competitor."); SNYDER & STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 79
(noting that developers work "very hard to create a favorable image" with local officials
and regulators).
179. Patrick O'Donnell, Developer Wields 'Power'; Schneider Scores with Four Proj-
ects, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 19, 1993, at 6B (quoting a major local developer).
Numerous anecdotal accounts suggest the importance to developers of maintaining a
favorable reputation with local officials and regulators. See, e.g., Alan Achkar, Developer
Wants to Squeeze a Giant Mall in Harrisville, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), June 12, 1994,
at 12B (describing a developer's efforts to build a mall in a small Oklahoma town); Mon-
ica Davey, Resorts Close in on "Our Little Mecca," ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 18,
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It is only in certain large-scale specialized development fields,
such as shopping mall and hotel development, that developers typi-
cally operate on a broad geographic basis.' Even in those contexts,
when a national developer might anticipate having only one project
in any given locality, the developer may anticipate a long-term rela-
tionship with local regulators. For instance, the developer may
anticipate retaining ownership of the fully-constructed development
for a substantial period of time, in which case the developer may
need cooperation from the locality at various points in the future."'
Finally, even when a developer anticipates no post-construction
dealings with a given set of regulators, the developer still may be
concerned that her reputation with those regulators will "travel" to
other communities where she might hope to undertake projects. In
that case, the developer may deal with regulators just as if she were
1995, at 1B (describing a resort development on America Island in Florida); Gary Gately,
History Helped as Cordish Landed Power Plant Job, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 17, 1995, at
1C (emphasizing importance of reputation in firm selection); The Hahn Co. to Develop
Colorado's Next Shopping Center, BUSINESSWIRE, Mar. 21, 1995, available in WL,
Buswire (Dialog) Database; Tracey Kaplan & Daryl Kelley, Plans for Planting Another
Suburb, L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1994, at B1; Alex Montague, Struever Plans Two Industrial
Parks, BALTIMORE BUS. J., June 8, 1987, at 1, available in 1987 WL 2289467 (highlighting
developer's successful reputation in Baltimore); Dina Nelson, Voters to Decide on Pro-
posed Giveaway for Jacobson's, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 11, 1995, at 1B, available in
WL, PB-Post (Dialog) Database (describing political debate surrounding plans in Florida
town for retail development); Morris Newman, Building in "Soviet Monica": Developers
Find Artful Ways of Meeting Community Concerns, L.A. Bus, J., Jan. 18, 1988, at 6, avail-
able in LEXIS, News library, BUSDTL file (discussing the necessity for developers to be
involved in Santa Monica politics); Progress Downtown, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Dec. 25,
1994, at 2C, available in 1994 WL 9351406 (citing developer's good reputation as reason
for city's encouragement of condominium development along the Scioto River); Rudolph
A. Pyatt, Jr., For Fairfax Developers, Truce-and Partnership-May Be the Best Defense,
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1989, at E3 (discussing developer's resistance to growth control
measures); Joseph Rocha, Opposition Voiced to Super KMart Plan, HARTFORD
COURANT, Aug. 11, 1994, at D5, available in 1994 WL 6634697 (discussing public opposi-
tion to retail store development); The View From Tampa, NEW Bus., May 1985, at 53,
available in LEXIS, News library, ARCNWS file; Nina Walfoort, Raleigh, N.C., Proves
That Restrictions Can Work, COURIER-J. (Louisville), Feb. 28, 1996, at A8 (discussing
tree ordinance in Raleigh, North Carolina); Steve Wright, Lashutka Rips Foes of Mall,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 1993, at 1A, available in WL, Col-Disp (Dialog) Data-
base.
180. Even within the large commercial development context, "[f]ew developers...
[are] national in scope; most... [are] regional in their focus." Michael L. Evans, Top
Office Developer Survey: Is 1992 a Replay of 1991?, NAT'L REAL EST. INVESTOR, June
1992, at 52.
181. See, e.g., BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC., How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 150-53 (1989) (emphasizing the long-term relationships be-
tween local officials and developers of large commercial shopping areas); MARY ALICE
HINES, SHOPPING CENTER DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT 4 (1983) (noting that
shopping centers represent long-run investments for developers).
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engaged in a repeat-rather than a one-time-relationship.
The responses of regulators and developers to the prospect of
nexus/rough proportionality review may be quite different in the re-
peat-game context than in the one-time context. Consider, for
example, the townhouse developer in our previous example. Assume
that the developer anticipates having one project per year in the lo-
cality for the foreseeable future. It is now Year One, and the
developer will agree to any requested conditions in order to obtain
development permission for the Year One project. The more inter-
esting question is whether the developer will sue for restitution at the
beginning of Year Two. The developer may fear that, if she sues for
restitution, the locality will retaliate by denying her development
permission for future projects (e.g., Year Two and Year Three proj-
ects) or, less drastically, by requiring more studies and paperwork
than are truly necessary or by delaying grants of permission.
To decide whether a restitution suit is the best course, the devel-
oper would have to compare the expected benefits of restitution and
the expected costs of the locality's retaliation. That cost will depend
upon, among other factors: (1) the anticipated profits, in present
value terms, that could be derived from the projects planned for
Years Two, Three, and beyond; (2) the likelihood that regulators
could and would seek retaliation; and (3) the expected loss or dimi-
nution in profit that would result from such retaliation. The greater
the number and size of the projects the developer hopes to complete
in the locality, the greater the continuity in the political and regula-
tory regime in the locality from one year to the next, and the greater
the local regulators' reputation for "tough" retaliation, the more
likely it is that the developer will forego seeking restitution.
In Year One, before any construction, local regulators presuma-
bly will understand that the developer will calculate the cost of suing
for restitution at the beginning of Year Two. In order to maximize
the likelihood that the developer will forego litigation in Year Two,
local regulators may temper their development conditions demands
for the Year One project." Thus, while the prospect of nexus/rough
proportionality review may not have dramatic effects on the severity
182. Nexus/rough proportionality review also may lead to a reduction in the overall
severity of development conditions because, in effect, it lessens meaningful competition
among developers for development opportunities. As discussed below, local regulators
may respond to nexus/rough proportionality review by doing business only with estab-
lished, repeat-player developers. As a result of the constriction on the pool of developers,
local regulators may not be able to command as high a price for development permission
as they would in an unconstrained or open market.
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of development conditions in the repeat-transaction context, it may
have some modest tempering effects."' Local regulators, however,
may respond to any subsequent developer restitution suit or threat of
suit with extreme and highly public ostracism of the developer, so as
to establish and maintain a reputation for effective retaliation.
C. Nexus/Rough Proportionality Review as a Barrier to Entry
The preceding analysis suggests that nexus/rough proportionality
review provides localities with an incentive to discriminate in favor of
established developers and against new or unknown developers in the
pre-construction stage of development projects. New entrants into a
development market lack an established relationship with regulators
and, for that very reason, have relatively little to lose by suing for res-
titution and hence alienating regulators.'8 Conversely, established
183. For a discussion of the literature modeling disproportionate or extreme retalia-
tion as a rational response in repeat games, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 41-44
(1992).
The preceding analysis applies only where the "game" between the developer and
regulator is expected to repeat indefinitely or at least until an as-yet-undetermined point.
When the game is an iterated or repeat game with a pre-set ending point, the game dy-
namics actually may resemble those of one-time or non-repeat games. For example,
imagine that a developer is interested in two-and only two-projects in a particular lo-
cality. The first project is planned for Year One; the second is planned for Year Four.
The first project is a net negative externality project for the locality. Unless the locality
can obtain and keep $100,000 in development conditions in return for its permission to
allow the project to proceed, the majority of residents would favor a development prohi-
bition. The second project is a net positive externality project for the regulating locality,
so that the majority would favor even an unconditional grant of development permission.
The game between the developer and regulators involves only two rounds-the project
Year One round and the project Year Four round.
For local regulators deciding whether to deny or grant permission for the Year One
project, the relevant question is when, if ever, the developer would be barred from suing
for restitution of the $100,000 collected in connection with the Year One project. If the
applicable statutory or equitable limitation on suits requires a developer to file suit for
restitution of unconstitutional development fees within, for example, two years or less,
then local regulators might feel adequately protected against post-construction litigation
regarding the Year One project; in such a legal regime, the developer would have to sue
the locality for restitution before receiving permission for the Year Four project, and the
developer understandably is unlikely to do so. If there is no time limitation on developer
suits, the developer could simply wait until the Year Four project is completed and then
sue for restitution of the $100,000 collected in connection with the Year One project. If
local regulators are operating in such a legal regime, they might well decide, ex ante, to
deny permission altogether for the Year One project, which is exactly the same result as
would obtain in a one-time game between the developer and local regulators regarding
the Year One project.
184. There is a broad consensus that, even before the advent of nexus/rough propor-
tionality review, local land use regulations operated as a barrier to entry for new
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developers whose businesses flourish on the basis of their relation-
ships with regulators have a great deal to lose by seeking restitution
and hence are less likely to do so.
Local regulators' incentive to discriminate against new develop-
ers may be enhanced by the regulators' risk aversion with respect to
future restitution judgments against their localities.' Restitution
suits and judgments might well generate public criticism of local
planning staff, and "bureaucrats, like most persons, are sensitive to
possible embarrassment."'"M Moreover, in public administration, firm
expectations of entitlement develop once funds are budgeted, and
regulators thus may receive more disapproval by eliminating a previ-
ously budgeted program in order to pay a restitution judgment than
they would have if they had never budgeted the program in the firstplace."
developers in many land markets. See, e.g., Charles J. Delaney & Marc T. Smith, Devel-
opment Exactions: Winners and Losers, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 195, 200 (1989) (concluding
that "land use controls, including impact fees ... limit the entry of outside builders to a
particular market"); David E. Dowall, The Effect of Land Use and Environmental Regu-
lations on Housing Costs, 8 POL'Y STUD. J. 277,283 (1979) ("Land use and environmental
regulations that rely on complex administrative procedures act as barriers to market en-
try. If the level of complexity is great, potential developers will be reluctant to enter local
markets. The costs of adjusting to new and unknown administrative programs is high.
Developers who have established good working relationships with local planners are
more likely to obtain development permission."); Michael B. Gerrard, The Victims of
NIMBY, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 495, 507 (1994) (noting that land use regulations can
"discourage new developers from entering the market"); John D. Landis, Land Regula-
tion and the Price of New Housing, 52 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 9, 10 (1986) (presenting case
studies of regulatory and other barriers to entry in three California cities); S. Mark White,
Development Fees and Exemptions for Affordable Housing: Tailoring Regulations to
Achieve Multiple Public Objectives, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 25,29 (1990) (noting that
"strict land use regulations" can constitute "'barriers to developer entry'" (citations
omitted)).
185. For an interesting discussion of the definitions of risk-aversion employed in eco-
nomics, see KENNETH J. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 103-04
(1971).
186. Glen 0. Robinson, Stalking the Washington Bureaucrat, 68 CORNELL L. REV.
269, 276 (1983) (reviewing HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR OF
FEDERAL BUREAU CHIEFS (1981)); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institu-
tional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 837, 859 (1994) (suggesting
that civil servants are generally risk-averse "because a visible mistake could be embar-
rassing ... but a below-market performance will not cost them their jobs"); Howard
Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21
ENVTL. L. 1647, 1676 (1991) (discussing bureaucratic risk-aversion with respect to the
risk of public criticism); Robinson, supra, at 276 (noting that "too great a sensitivity [to
public criticism] may induce a degree of risk aversion that is harmful to the public inter-
est" and that "Itihere has been speculation that just such risk aversion underlies some
regulatory attitudes").
187. Substantial empirical research confirms what we all (local officials included) in-
tuitively know: "[P]eople consistently attach more disutility to losing a sum of money or a
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For their part, potential new entrants in local land development
markets also may be risk-averse with respect to the risk that regula-
tors will discriminate against them by, for example, denying or
delaying development permission. Even when developers are not
risk-averse,1" the lenders underwriting them may be."9 As a result,
nexus/rough proportionality review not only may make it more diffi-
cult for new entrants to flourish in land development markets, it also
may discourage potential new entrants from even trying.
The exclusion of new entrants from development markets is so-
cially costly. In some instances, new entrants might be able to derive
more value from a parcel than established developers. For example,
a new entrant might be able to generate $1,000,000 in wealth from
the development of a given parcel while an established developer
could derive only $500,000. In a competitive market, the new entrant
would outbid the established developer and societal wealth-creation
would be maximized. When potential new entrants are excluded,
however, wealth-creation will not be maximized. For their part, po-
tential new entrants will have to allocate their capital to alternative
and presumably less profitable investments!"
valuable possession than they do to failing to gain the same sum or good .. Edward J.
McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1874 (1994) (summarizing
the theoretical and experimental literature).
188. As a general matter, risk-aversion tends to vary inversely with the investor's
wealth and, holding wealth constant, it varies with the magnitude of the possible losses.
See Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 108, at 601-02. Some land developers have relatively
limited assets and hence limited capacity to self-insure through investment portfolio di-
versification. Cf Lettice Stuart, Housing The Elderly: "Assisted Living" Builders
Regroup for the 90s, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1993, at 3 (discussing "undercapitalization" of
many developers in the 1980s).
189. Although lending institutions engaged in aggressive lending during the real estate
boom of the 1980s, they traditionally have been regarded as fairly cautious or risk-averse
business enterprises; an extensive body of state and federal bank underwriting regulation
is intended to ensure that such institutions place their solvency above profit considera-
tions. See generally 1 ALFRED M. POLLARD ET AL., BANKING LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES § 11.01 (2d ed. 1992) ("[M]aintaining bank safety and soundness is the pervasive
theme of the banking law of the United States and is pursued ... through many de-
vices.").
190. The preceding analysis assumes that the only party who may challenge develop-
ment conditions under the nexus/rough proportionality standard is the developer who has
been asked to, or already has complied with, the conditions. One could imagine a legal
regime in which, in addition, (1) community groups challenge conditions as too lax; and
(2) developers challenge conditions imposed on their competitors as too lax. It is quite
clear, however, that such suits are not permissible under Nollan and Dolan because those
cases are concerned only with the Takings Clause implications of excessively strict devel-
opment conditions. Only a developer subject to excessive conditions would have standing
to bring a nexus/rough proportionality case. But see FISCHEL, supra note 123, at 349-50
(suggesting that Nollan might "offer ... leverage to third parties" such as community
groups).
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D. Curtailing Circumvention
One possible objection to this analysis is that it seems to assume
that nothing can be done to curtail regulators' avoidance or circum-
vention of nexus/rough proportionality review. If the current legal
regime could be altered to limit the possibilities for, and hence costs
of, circumvention, nexus/rough proportionality review might not en-
gender inefficient development prohibitions and discrimination
against new entrants in development markets.
There are two possible means of effectively limiting circumven-
tion, but neither is likely to be implemented. The first entails an
expansion in the scope of judicial scrutiny-more judicial review
rather than less. If courts reviewed development prohibitions with
the same scrutiny as development conditions, regulators could not
circumvent judicial review by denying development permission
rather than granting conditional permission. Nor could they readily
discriminate against new entrant developers by denying them devel-
opment permission for their projects while granting established
developers conditional permission for comparable projects. The ex-
tension of judicial scrutiny to development prohibitions makes
theoretical as well as practical sense because, as discussed in Part II,
there seems to be no theoretical basis for differentiating between the
level of judicial review accorded development prohibitions and that
accorded development conditions.
That extension, however, probably will not occur. The ability of
a community to prohibit certain uses of property, subject only to rela-
tively peripheral Takings Clause limitations, is deeply established in
our legal and political culture.191 Significant judicial limitations on
that ability almost certainly would be greeted as a radical judicial en-
croachment on the democratic political sphere. Indeed, even avid
property rights advocates regard such judicial policing of local deci-
sion-making as, at least at present, an unattainable constitutional
Note also that nexus/rough proportionality review may constitute a socially costly
barrier to entry for new developments that will generate net negative externalities and for
developments that will generate net positive externalities. As discussed above,
nexus/rough proportionality review will not result in the invalidation of allocatively effi-
cient development conditions or more flat development prohibitions in cases involving
net positive externality development. But it may be in local regulators' interest to dis-
criminate in favor of established developers even in the context of net positive externality
development: Such discrimination will ensure that regulators reap the net positive exter-
nalities of new development, the additional benefits that flow from development
conditions, and some protection against post-construction restitution suits.




Another possible means of limiting circumvention is legislative,
rather than judicial. As noted above, jurisdictions vary dramatically
in the discretion their statutes accord local regulators in making case-
specific development prohibition and condition decisions.'93 The ar-
gument in favor of case-by-case regulator discretion, of course, is that
it allows regulators to take full account of the myriad real distinctions
among development projects; strict statutory requirements may force
regulators to treat unlike situations alike.1 14 The argument against
discretion is that it allows for covert illegitimate decision-making by
regulators. The adoption of nexus/rough proportionality review in-
creases the incentives for covert illegitimate decision-making by
giving regulators an incentive to use their discretion to disfavor new
entrants and favor established developers. In that sense, the adop-
tion of nexus/rough proportionality review strengthens the argument
for statutory requirements limiting local land use regulators' case-by-
case discretion.'"
192. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 63 (defending the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine as a "second-best" solution to the problem of governmental intrusion upon prop-
erty rights).
193. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
194. See SNYDER & STEGMAN, supra note 26, at 30 (noting that uniform fees will not
promote "efficient development" to the extent that they fail to "reflect the actual differ-
ences in the costs to the city of providing infrastructure and services to developments of
different types and at different locations"); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regula-
tion: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of Discretion, 24 GA. L. REv. 525, 528 (1990)
(discussing the merits of discretion for local land use regulators).
195. Similarly, the adoption of nexus/rough proportionality review might strengthen
the argument for a new equal protection jurisprudence that would facilitate developers'
suits against localities for unequal treatment in the regulatory permitting process. Under
current equal protection principles, such suits are reviewed under a rational basis stan-
dard which virtually assures that localities will prevail. See Candid Enters. v. Grossmont
Union High Sch. Dist., 705 P.2d 876, 885 (Cal. 1985) (a developer's equal protection suit
must be reviewed under "'the basic and conventional standard,' which ... '"requir[es]
merely that distinctions drawn... bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legiti-
mate state purpose."'... We may not review the challenged local measure under any
stricter standard: developers do not constitute a 'suspect class,' and development is not a
'fundamental interest.'" (citations omitted)); Susan M. Denbo, Development Exactions:
A New Way to Fund State and Local Government: Infrastructure Improvements and Af-
fordable Housing?, 23 REAL EsT. L.J. 7, 15 (1994) (suggesting that traditional judicial
deference would undermine developers' efforts to challenge development fees on equal
protection grounds); see also Juster Assocs. v. City of Rutland, 901 F.2d 266, 270-72 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding that, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine extending antitrust immu-
nity to private citizens' petitions of government tribunals, a developer who enters into
favorable agreements with a locality for building permission is immune from antitrust suit
by another developer (citing, inter alia, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365
U.S. 127 (1961))).
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The catch-22 is that local political majorities have no incentive to
enact such statutory requirements as a response to nexus/rough pro-
portionality review. Recall that the basic "story" of excessive
development conditions is that they are imposed to benefit a domi-
nant political majority at the expense of developers and future
residents.' As long as regulators' informal discrimination against
new entrants helps to ensure that the dominant political majority will
continue to reap the benefits of excessive development conditions,
the majority has no cause to constrain the regulators. Thus, while
legislative measures could be taken to limit the circumvention costs
associated with nexus/rough proportionality review, there is little rea-
son to predict that those measures will be taken.
V. CONCLUSION
Nexus/rough proportionality review probably cannot be justified
on allocative efficiency grounds. Indeed, rather than enhance the
efficiency of land development markets, nexus/rough proportionality
review may make matters worse. The nexus and rough proportional-
ity tests may force courts to invalidate development conditions that
are aliocatively efficient, even when localities lack other means of
forcing new development to internalize its net social costs. In order
to avoid nexus/rough proportionality review, local regulators may
deny development permission in cases where they previously would
have approved projects. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, local
regulators may protect themselves against post-construction suits for
restitution by limiting development permission to repeat players in
development markets. Any overall assessment of nexus/rough pro-
portionality review should take account of its possible perverse
effects.
Of course, the preceding analysis of the possible perverse effects
of nexus/rough proportionality review does not prove that such re-
view is socially undesirable in practice. At this point, any direct
empirical study of the effects of nexus/rough proportionality review
probably would be infeasible because, at least arguably, the state
courts have not yet begun to apply the nexus and rough proportion-
ality tests in earnest.1" If the United States Supreme Court wishes
the state courts to apply the nexus and rough proportionality tests in
earnest, the Court may need to accept certiorari on additional devel-
opment conditions cases and strongly reaffirm the nexus and rough
196. See supra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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proportionality tests in those cases. This Article, at the least, raises
questions as to whether that would be a desirable strategy for the
Court to adopt.

